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ABSTRACT 
 
An Analysis of the Effects of War on the United States Stock Market 
 
While different scholars agree that war has a significant impact on the volatility in the 
United States stock market, they come to contradictory findings on the direction of this 
impact.  The goal of this thesis is to analyze the effects that war has on the returns in U.S. 
financial markets. The empirical study employs quarterly prices of the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average index from October 1960 to September 2015 and applies a time series 
model in order to determine the effects on stock prices during U.S. war involvements 
overseas. Results show that even though the entry of United States into war has a positive 
effect on the quarterly returns from the Dow Jones Industrial Average index, different 
types of war can have an increasing or decreasing impact on DJIA real returns. This has 
important implications for investors today and in the future. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Economists studied the causes and consequences of war to predict the direction of 
the future economic activity. Recently, financial market reactions were induced by wars 
and conflicts. War can confuse investors and produce adverse reactions in the stock 
market because it raises uncertainty. This uncertainty is a product of investors’ inability 
to predict the war developments and their impact on the stock market. In many instances 
since 1960, it was unclear to the general public when war was going to start or end, what 
the cost will be to the United States, and how companies’ sales and production trends 
might be affected. Thus, war can magnify or mitigate the returns that investors are 
expecting to receive from equity markets. Uncertainty in financial markets can increase 
inaccuracy of stock price valuations and lower predictability of future price movements.  
The thesis begins with a qualitative analysis of war effects that will study the 
nature of war, characteristics of war (such as war duration, developments, and costs) and 
underlying macroeconomic responses to determine the relationship of these war factors to 
economic performance and stock market evaluation. Since there have been no official 
declarations of war since 1960, the official authorization of war by Congress has an 
important impact on the war developments, duration, and war financing. Thus, Chapter 2 
analyzes whether the way government manages the war matters to financial markets. War 
financing measures such as the imposition of taxation, debt financing and increasing the 
money supply will be analyzed for their effect on the economy during and after the war. 
The timing and different phases (such as pre-war phase, during the war phase and 
post-war phase) of war show that different factors affect the returns from the stock 
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market in different directions (positive and negative). Chapter 3 analyzes different 
conflicts, in theory, methodology, and conclusions in the research done so far. To 
establish a detailed analysis of war effect the literature review will look for overall trends 
in war effect in the pre-war, during the war and post-war phase. The “war puzzle” theory 
by Brune, Hens, Rieger, and Wang (2012) argues that war will have an adverse effect on 
stock market performance. According to this theory, in the pre-war period, the likelihood 
of war and war risk affect stock market prices negatively. Once the war begins, there is a 
positive shock of war to the return from the stock market. During the war, the likelihood 
of U.S. winning the conflict rises the stock market evaluation. The polarization of the 
country that participates in war matters as well, because deep divide in political and 
social structure depreciates the stock market prices. As the conflict approaches the end, 
stock prices increase in value again as investors become more optimistic about the future 
economic movement. After the war has ended, however, the investor observes the 
consequences of fiscal and monetary policies and adjusts its position in the market.  
To clarify the adverse war effects, Chapter 4 tests the relationship of wars to stock 
market prices from a quantitative perspective. Empirically the effects of the United States 
involvement in the war on the volatility in stock market performance will be analyzed in 
hopes of finding the direction of the relationship. Because war characteristics should 
affect the way wars influence financial markets, the hypothesis assumes that outburst and 
length of war will affect different and magnitude of regression results. The regression 
results could be used to predict the direction of the movement in stock prices before the 
war, during the war, and after the war. Finally, Chapter 5 contains the legal and economic 
implications of war, conclusions, and proposals for future research. 
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Chapter 2: The United States at War, 1960-2015 
 
This chapter is a review of the literature on United States’ interstate wars. Apart 
from establishing a war categorization, this chapter also gives a brief overview of 
origination, developments, ways of war financing and consequences that some of these 
wars had on the United States. Also, in order to get a deeper sense of what the general 
public was thinking of war developments at the time, specific wars will be qualitatively 
analyzed by investigating primary resources such as interviews, speeches or newspaper 
articles. The goal of this chapter is to define war, describe the war power inside the 
United States, classify America's modern wars into broad categories, and describe the 
cases of conflicts that fit the research criteria offering qualitative analysis of these wars. 
In addition, focusing on the war-economy dynamics, the chapter studies how the 
performance of the economy is connected to the conduct of America’s war.  
Definition of War 
War is a central problem of international relations studies and politics. Some 
international relations scholars believe that states decide to use force when diplomacy 
fails to achieve the desired result. Other experts believe that war is a consequence of the 
breakdown of the international system because it occurs despite the rules that 
international institutions created to prevent or reduce the conflict between states. 
International institutions refers to international organizations, international regimes 
treaties, and conventions and so on (Duffield, 2007, p. 2). The official definition of war 
by Stanford University says that war is an actualized, deliberate and extensive armed 
conflict between political communities (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2005). 
War is a phenomenon which occurs only between political communities, defined as those 
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entities which either are nations or intend to become countries.  "War is a condition of 
armed hostility between states" (Hyde, 1945, p. 1686). This definition of states overlaps 
with Max Weber’s (1946) classical definition of the state as an organization exercising 
legitimate control over its own bounded territory, unchallenged by internal power 
competition or external intervention (Carlsnaes, Risse-Kappen, & Simmons, 2012, p. 
532). "War is a contention, through the use of armed force, between countries, 
undertaken for the purpose of overpowering another" (Von Glahn, 1992, p. 1992). 
Classical war is international war, a war between different states, such as the two World 
Wars. More frequent nowadays are U.S. - terrorist wars. These wars are characterized by 
the use of military, political, legal and conceptual force against these political pressure 
groups or terrorist organizations. Thus, it is important to have in mind that a country can 
intervene in a war with both state and political communities. 
War Powers inside the United States 
The formal way that the United States goes to war is through a declaration of war. 
The war power is separated and shared in the United States in the United States 
Constitution. Constitution, the War Power Clause, specifically Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 11 states that "the Congress shall have Power to …Declare War, grant Letters of 
Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water" (U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 8).  There are no specifications for the format of the legislation that is 
considered to be “declaration of war” and the Constitution itself does not use this term. In 
the past, Congress declared war by placing "declaration of war" in the document title. 
While Congress has the power to declare war, the executive power to make war is vested 
in the president of U.S., who is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. 
Additionally, Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that "the president shall be 
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Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States" (Constitution, 1912, p. 
A7). The war power is a shared power. As the Congress of the United States has the 
exclusive right to declare war, the president alone cannot send American forces into 
harms’ way.  
The Founding Fathers' intent was to minimize, and place checks on a single 
actor's war power. In August of 1787, the proposed draft of the Constitution stated that 
the Congress of the United States could “make war.” This wording was changed into 
“declare war” because the Constitution’s intent was to allow the executive branch, or the 
president, to resist sudden attacks (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8).  The Constitution is interpreted 
so that the president can engage in war without assistance and consent of Congress (U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 8). There are various occasions where presidents engaged in war or 
military actions without first checking with Congress first. As a response to one of the 
wars without a congressional declaration, the war in Vietnam, Congress passed the War 
Powers Act, or War Powers Resolution, in 1973 (United States Congress, 1973). This 
resolution was an attempt to further change constitutional regulations and requirements in 
war. War Powers Resolution was approved by both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate, but President Nixon used his veto power against it. Finally, the joint resolution 
was passed on November 7, 1973 as Congress overrode presidential veto power by 
having two-thirds vote in the Senate and House (Civic Impulse, 2016). Thus, by the 
United States Constitution, the war power in the United States is divided. The Congress is 
in charge of the process of declaring war while the president has executive war powers. 
Since World War II, the United States has not officially declared war. "Although 
Congress is empowered to declare war, it has done so only on five occasions: the War of 
1812, the Mexican War, the Spanish-American War, World War I and World War II" 
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(Fisher, 1998, p. 194). The Charter of the United Nations failed to recognize war as 
adequate means used in a nation's foreign policy. Instead, the UN Charter emphasized 
international peace and cooperation in solving international problems of various nature 
(such as economic, social, cultural or humanitarian) (Charter of United Nations, 1945, p.  
3).  The Charter gives the right of self-defense to states, but the states are the ones that 
decide what situations call for such right. Apart from not having any official declarations 
of War since World War II, U.S. Presidents have engaged in military operations without 
direct consent from Congress as well. Since the creation of War Powers Resolution in 
1973, 132 reports were submitted to Congress by presidents. Only six military actions 
were authorized by Congress while others were a unilateral act by the president. 
"Authorizations" of war permit the legislative and the executive branch to agree on 
limited war aims (Elsea, & Weed, 2014).  Authorization can lapse without a formal 
surrender; it can permit military action short of total war. Congress authorized specific 
statutory authorization within the meaning of War Powers Resolution. As a result, many 
resolutions and conventional wars were passed. Joint resolutions are used in order to 
authorize the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities (Elsea, & Weed, 
2014). According to the War Power Resolution, joint resolutions are also used to assign 
members of armed forces to “command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or 
accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government 
when such military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such forces 
will become engaged, in hostilities” (The War Powers Act of 1973). These resolutions 
have great importance for the United States involvement in war as they mark the 
beginning of an expanded military role. Therefore, congressional authorizations influence 
the intensity, funding of the war and duration in terms of use of force.  
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Wars led by the United States can be divided into two types: congressionally 
authorized wars and unilateral acts by the president. Table 1 lists wars that Fisher (2004) 
identified since the 1960s. Apart from the nature of war, the wars vary in duration. For 
example, Mayaguez Affairs was a unilateral act by the president that lasted only three 
days, while Vietnam/Gulf of Tonkin war lasted for more than ten years, in the period 
between August 7, 1964, and April 30, 1975. To understand the economics behind 
different types of war, it is necessary to comprehend the process of authorization and 
funds allocation in each scenario. Therefore the following section will analyze the 
process of congressional war authorizations and unilateral uses of force by the president.  
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Table 1: U.S. Periods of War and Dates of Recent Conflicts  
War War Start Date War End Date Type 
Vietnam War/Gulf of Tonkin August 7, 1964 April 30, 1975 Congressional war 
authorization 
Mayaguez Affair May 12, 1975 May 15, 1975 Unilateral act by the 
president 
Operation Eagle Claw April 24, 1980 April 25, 1980 Unilateral act by the 
president 
Lebanon (Beirut) September 29, 1982 February 26, 1984 Unilateral act by the 
president 
* UN Resolution; 
Multinational force 
Grenada October 25, 1983 December 15, 1983 Unilateral act by the 
president 
Libya March 24, 1986 April 18, 1986 Unilateral act by the 
president 
Persian Gulf Escorts/ 
Operation Earnest Will 
May 17, 1987 September 26, 1988 Unilateral act by the 
president 
Panama/Operation Just 
Cause 
December 20, 1989 January 31, 1990 Unilateral act by the 
president 
Persian Gulf War I/Operation 
Desert Shield/Operation 
Desert Storm 
August 2, 1990 February 28, 1991 Congressional war 
authorization 
Missile Attacks on Baghdad June 26, 1993 June 26, 1993 Unilateral act by the 
president 
Combat Operations in 
Somalia/Operation Gothic 
Serpent 
August 8 1993 March 24, 1994 Unilateral act by the 
president 
Haiti/Operation Uphold 
Democracy 
September 19, 1994 March 31, 1995 Unilateral act by the 
president 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina/Operation 
Deliberate Force 
August 30, 1995 September 20, 1995 Unilateral act by the 
president 
Iraq missile 
attacks/Operation Desert Fox 
December 16, 1998 December 19, 1998 Unilateral act by the 
president 
Sudan and Afghanistan 
missile attacks/Operation 
Infinite Reach 
August 20, 1998 August 20, 1998 Unilateral act by the 
president 
Conflicts in Yugoslavia/Serbia March 24, 1999 June 11, 1999 Unilateral act by the 
president 
Afghanistan/Operation 
Enduring Freedom 
October 7, 2001 Present Congressional war 
authorization 
Persian Gulf War 
II/Iraq/Operation Enduring 
Freedom 
March 20, 2003 May 1, 2003 Congressional war 
authorization 
Conflicts in Libya March 19, 2011 October 31, 2011 Unilateral act by the 
president 
Source: Fisher, L. (2004). Presidential War Powers. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.  
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Wars Authorized by Congress 
Wars that are approved by Congress can also be called wars funded, regulated 
and, governed by Congress. These wars can be either officially declared or undeclared. 
Thus, Congress can conduct oversight of military forces. Congressional authorizations of 
war are important as they allow the president to lead a military campaign consistent with 
the scope defined by Congress. While the President is authorized to carry out these 
congressionally authorized wars, Congress oversees military forces (Lobel, 2008, p. 393).  
The Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate military troops and set troop limits 
(Prakash, 2008, p. 337). Specifically Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution gives 
Congress the right to regulate the U.S. armed forces. Once the war is authorized, 
however, it is the President, qua, Commander-in-Chief who orders the aims, tactics and 
strategies of the armed forces (Elsea, & Weed, 2014). This indicates that Congress can 
exercise its power on the military by regulating and financing every use of force or war. 
Critics hold that there is a gray area of concurrent powers, by which Congress can limit 
presidential powers (Lobel, 2008, p. 394).  
Apart from having greater political support, wars that are authorized by Congress 
have greater access to capital as the government approves for these outlays in their 
budget. Legislation such as the Budgeting and Accounting Acts of 1921 and the 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 defines the budget process inside 
the United States (Elsea, & Weed, 2014). The process starts with the President of the 
United States who submits a request for a budget to Congress. The Congress authorizes 
the funds for general federal government programs (Elsea, & Weed, 2014). The House 
and Senate Appropriation Committees allocate funds for the general federal government 
programs in the following fiscal year. Discretionary spending refers to these spending 
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sets authorized by Congress. A major part of discretionary spending is military spending. 
While the President is involved in the allocation of discretionary funds, Congress is the 
one that has the power to raise and spend money for the federal government. Apart from 
this, not all appropriation bills and president’s budget requests are authorized (Elsea, & 
Weed, 2014). Congress is also able to enact continuing resolutions that provide for the 
temporary funding of government operations. Typically, congressional authorizations are 
made for major military conflicts (Elsea, & Weed, 2014). Apart from having small 
resource limits, these wars also have no time limits as well and usually last longer than 90 
days. Since wars authorized by Congress are long, they have more chances of impacting 
the economy as they require much more resources than a war shorter than 90 days (Elsea, 
& Weed, 2014).  
Unilateral Acts by the President 
The president is required to report to Congress any introduction of U.S. forces 
into hostilities or imminent hostilities. “The War Powers Resolution (WPR) states that 
the President's powers as Commander in Chief to introduce U.S. forces into hostilities or 
imminent hostilities are exercised only pursuant to: (1) a declaration of war; (2) specific 
statutory authorization; or (3) a national emergency created by an attack on the United 
States or its forces" (Grimmet, 2012, p. 2). By this resolution, the President has 48 hours 
to dispatch military forces into action. The military forces cannot stay for more than 60 
days in the position without congressional authorization, and the military forces must be 
completely withdrawn within 90 days if no congressional authorization for the use of 
military force or a declaration of war by United States is delivered. Military force must be 
terminated within this time period unless Congress authorizes such use or extends the 
time period. Before and during these 90 days the president is still recommended to 
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consult with Congress.  Presidents have frequently acted unilaterally, and critics maintain 
that in doing so presidents took a role of legislative authority when in fact Congress is the 
only one that has the right to exercise legislative war powers. As the War Powers Act 
states “President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before 
introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or situations where imminent 
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances” (War Powers 
Resolution, 1973).  
The president can take decisive action to defend the United States, but this does 
not mean that Congress has no responsibility. Congress has an obligation to vote whether 
to declare, authorize and continue the war. Some argue that the Supreme Court provided 
the executive branch with very broad, extensive powers beyond those confined in the 
Constitution. “The acquiescence theory is one of the strongest arguments today for 
allowing a president to act alone in the area of foreign affairs” (Chapman, 1996, p. 177). 
The Court justified this result by Congressional silence. Thus "the President is able to act 
unilaterally on almost any issue if he is willing to wager that Congress will remain silent, 
impliedly consenting to his conduct, and thus conferring upon him authority to act" 
(Chapman, 1996, p. 176). 
During this period the decision to commit to war in the United States was seen 
shifting from the Congress to the executive branch. In most cases legislation authorizing 
the use of military force has been preceded by a request by the President for such 
authority (Torreon, 2015, p. 5). "Most recently, due to an expansive interpretation of the 
President's constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and of 
his inherent powers to use force without congressional authorization, the president 
welcomed support from Congress in the form of legislation authorizing him to utilize 
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U.S. military forces in a foreign conflict or engagement in support of U.S. interests, but 
has not taken the view that he is required to obtain such authorization" (Torreon, 2015, p. 
5). As a result of the War Powers Resolution, most conflicts since 1980 have been United 
States' military deployments noted by Congress through reports from Presidents. 
The only war power of the president that Congress cannot override is the power to 
command. The War Powers Act requires the president to start reporting to Congress 
within 48 hours after he dispatches military force into action (Grimmet, 2001, p. 3).  
As unilateral acts by presidents are supposed to be shorter wars with fixed costs 
and resources, it would be logical to assume that these wars had less impact on the 
economy. While the impact on the economy is intuitive, the impact on financial markets 
is much more complex as more factors should be looked at during the analysis.  
War Financing: Three Ways to Finance Government Spending 
War finance and deficit financing are historically related. At the time of war, the 
United States government has to spend more than its revenue receipts from taxes. War 
cost is one of the most important factors that influences the economy of the United States, 
the three types of war financing will be analyzed to determine their effect on the 
economy. War financing uses different fiscal and monetary policies in meeting the cost of 
war such as various types of loans, taxation, and the creation of money (Gordon, 1998). 
Government spending during the war may or may not benefit the economy, but the cost 
should not be ignored. There are two types of government spending, discretionary and 
mandatory spending (Stone, 2012, p. 479). While mandatory spending is concerned with 
essential spending on programs such as Social Security or Medicare, discretionary 
spending is the type of spending that increases due to war activities (Stone, 2012, p. 479). 
Because it accounts for one-third of government spending, increases in discretionary 
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spending raise the total government spending. Figure 1 shows historical increases in debt 
to finance the wars as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Observing debt as 
a percentage of GDP is important because the national income of a country is compared 
to the debt. Significant spikes in the ratio occurred during World War I and World War 
II.  The size of the federal debt has increased in the years since World War II, compared 
to the years before 1914, with deficit about 30 percent of Gross Domestic Product and 
edging to about 50 percent in the 2010 (Congressional Budget Office, 2014).  
Figure 1: U.S. Federal Debt as Percentage of GDP (1970-2030) 
 
Source: Congressional Budget Office, 2014.  
The United States raises money for war purposes by increasing government 
spending and financing it in three major ways: taxation, deficit financing, and printing 
money. Even though literature says that taxation was the most often used method for war 
funding, other scholars indicate that the wars were funded by a mix of debt and taxes 
(Cappella, 2012). The most recent wars, such as wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were 
financed through debt (Bank, Kirk, & Thorndike, 2008). Thus, states do not only use 
taxation for modern wars. Figure 2 shows the variation in war financing methods that the 
United States has used since 1765. While printing money and taxation were the least used 
methods for war funding, there were still exceptions, such as Korean War, that was 
financed 100% by these methods. The next section will analyze which factors come into 
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play when determining the method of war financing.  
Figure 2: Variation in United States’ War Finance 
 
Source: Capella, R. (2012). The Political Economy of War Finance. Publicly Accessible 
Penn Dissertations.  
1) Raising Taxes 
To finance an increase in government spending through taxation, the government 
legally requires their citizens to pay increase in taxes. When government increases taxes 
and less money is available to the public, the government is using contractionary fiscal 
policy. Figure 3 shows IS-LM Model, or Hicks-Hansen Model for the occasion where the 
government raises taxes in order to finance a war. This model demonstrates the 
relationship that real output, in the goods and services market and assets market have to 
interest rates (Gordon, 1998, p. 93). The “investment savings” (IS) curve is downward 
sloping which indicates combinations of income and interest rates at which the goods 
market is in equilibrium, “given the state of business and consumer confidence, the 
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marginal propensity to save, and the level of  government spending, taxes and net 
exports” (Gordon, 1998, p. 93). On the contrary, the "liquidity preference money supply" 
(LM) curve is an upward sloping curve that represents a set of output and interest rate 
combinations where the money market and bond market are in equilibrium (Gordon, 
1998, p. 109). The increase in government spending (G) shifts the IS curve to right. The 
increase in taxes (T), shifts the IS curve back, to the left because it decreases consumer 
spending. Since interest rates rise, investment is reduced. This movement from point A 
backwards to point C is an example of crowding out effect, which describes the effect of 
an increase in government spending in reducing the amount of investment. Crowding out 
is defined as “a decrease in private expenditures as a consequence of increased 
government spending or the financing needs of a budget deficit” (Arnold, 2008, p. 238). 
Increase in taxes causes only an incomplete crowding out effects, since the decline in 
investment only partially offsets the increase in government spending. The net result of 
these shifts is a small increase in both the interest rates and Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). To summarize, in the short-run, tax increases hurt the economy as the demand is 
reduced as a consequence of lower consumption spending. But because government 
spending increases, the net effect is a small increase in output, or GDP.  
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Figure 3: Raising Taxes (IS-LM Model) 
 
Financing of major wars by the United States has led to changes in taxation. Historical 
origins of the first federal income tax are the Civil War. In 1862, the Treasury was 
collecting taxes from federal employees until the law was repealed and declared 
unconstitutional in 1872 and 1894 respectfully (Higgs, 2007). World War I made the 
federal income tax permanent. World War II brought tax withholding in 1943.  In 1969, 
at the peak of the Vietnam War, the United States reached a budget surplus because of an 
additional tax surcharge that Congress forced President Lyndon B. Johnson to accept. A 
ten percent surtax was imposed to pay for the Vietnam War, which raised revenue by 
about one percent of GDP. “History shows that wars financed by higher taxes, such as the 
Korean War and the first Gulf War, end quickly, while those financed largely by the 
deficit, such as the Vietnam War and current Middle East conflicts, tend to drag on 
indefinitely” (Bartlett, 2009). When raising taxes is not possible, the U.S. government 
finances its war efforts by raising debt in the form of issuing bonds, or Treasury Bills (T-
Bills).  
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Raising taxes is not popular politically. In 2013, Flores-Macias and Kreps (2013) 
concluded that taxes “make the cost of war painfully obvious to the general public and 
undermine support for it, or at least, create incentives for leaders to keep wars short and 
low cost” (Flores-Macias & Kreps, 2013, p. 31). Thus, war financing through direct 
taxation decreases the public support and the war duration. The use of taxation also 
depended historically on partisan preferences inside the United States. According to 
Flores-Macias and Kreps (2013), “to the extent that taxation meant ad valorem taxes 
before 1913, Republicans tended to favor war taxes as a form of war finance, as their core 
constituencies favored protective tariffs and after 1913, when taxes generally meant 
income taxes, Democrats were more inclined to resort to taxation as a form of war 
finance” (p. 31). Because the type of tax is changed over time, the Republicans supported 
lower taxes to preserve business interest, and Democrats supported the progressive 
measure of income taxation. “Democrats were associated with many wars of the 20th 
century- World War I, Korea, Vietnam- at a time in which they were the party more 
sympathetic to taxation” (Flores-Macias & Kreps, 2013, p. 24). Thus, the influence of 
these two sides is significant for determining whether taxation will be the method for next 
war financing.   
2) Treasury Issues T- Bills- the Public Buys Them 
The United States government is known to be the largest issuer of debt securities 
such as Treasury bills (T-Bills), notes and bonds. Total debt securities outstanding in the 
third quarter of 2015 was 36,676.5 billion of U.S. dollars (“Summary of debt securities 
statistics,” 2016). Domestic individuals and foreigners are the ones that hold the T-bills 
that U.S. Treasury issues. By financing the war through raising debt, the U.S. government 
is taking money from the public and placing it out of distribution. This public money is 
18 
 
no longer used for consumer spending and investment (Gordon, 1998). Figure 4 shows 
that, if all other factors remain constant, the interest rates will increase while output will 
not rise as quickly. Because the United States government has the power to borrow a 
significant amount of money from the public, the real interest rate will rise substantially. 
High interest rates are a result of a decrease in bond prices, caused by an influx of 
government bonds to the market (Gordon, 1998). Because there is a significant amount of 
T-Bills in the market offered at a discounted price, the public sees them as a better 
investment option than savings accounts. Thus, private money that was previously used 
to buy corporate debt is directed to purchasing government debt. This scenario is an 
example of asset market crowding out because companies’ bonds are priced out of the 
financial market.  
 
Figure 4: Treasury Issues T-Bills - The Public Buys Them (IS-LM Model) 
 
 
U.S. debt financed most of the modern wars. The long-term cost of this kind of 
war financing is paying off large amounts of debt incurred as the U.S. government fails to 
include their costs in annual budgets. Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were financed largely 
by domestic and foreign debt. About 70 percent of these wars came from domestic debt 
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financing and 30 percent from foreign buyers, such as China and Japan (Capella, 2012). 
3) “Monetizing the Deficit” 
The third way of financing a war is when the Federal Reserve buys the 
government securities, specifically U.S. Treasury Bills. This is an example of 
expansionary monetary policy where the Federal Reserve’s market operations replace 
government debt with money (Gordon, 1998). Expanding the money supply is done by 
the Federal Reserve which then purchases the U.S. T-Bills. Government spending 
increases which leads to an upward shift in IS curve. This shift in IS leads to increased 
production and interest rates. However, because the Federal Reserve creates money and 
increases the money supply (M2), instead of ending at the B point the economy moves 
from point A to point C. Figure 5 shows that the effect on interest rates is inconclusive 
and there is no private crowding out since the level of interest rates did not increase. In 
the short run, however, the effect on Gross Domestic Product is considerable. The 
increase in total output, or GDP, is a result of an increase in consumer spending, 
government spending, and investment (Gordon, 1998). By keeping levels of interest rates 
low, the government encourages individuals, banks and companies to borrow.  
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Figure 5: Monetizing the Deficit (IS-LM Model) 
 
 
This type of war financing is usually seen in wars where no more taxes can be 
collected and when the government does not want to increase interest rates. One of the 
reasons why in 1971 Nixon abandoned the “gold standard,” which was the monetary 
system that connected the United States dollar to gold, was the government’s intention to 
increase the money supply (Labonte & Levit, 2008, p. 5). His goal was to get rid of high 
unemployment and inflation levels without raising the gold reserves. Critics argue that 
apart from stimulating the economy, Nixon increased the money supply for funding the 
war in Vietnam (Labonte & Levit, 2008, p. 6). However, they also argue that creating 
money is one of the riskiest forms of war financing because, in the past, this type of 
policy would lead to inflation. However, since 2008 until January 2015, the Federal 
Reserve has tripled the money supply without raising the inflation levels. This 
phenomenon suggests that traditional theory about monetary policy, money supply, and 
inflation should be revised.   
In conclusion, taxation has a direct impact on individuals’ purchasing power and 
indicates that there is a clear connection between the public and the war, whereas the 
costs of borrowing by issuing T-bills are deferred. Thus, there is greater support for war 
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in the absence of taxation. Taxation, as a form of war finance, is, therefore, identical to 
borrowing public support for the war. As long as the taxes are low, the public would give 
higher support for United States involvement in the war. In the absence of a tax increase, 
however, the cost of war is less apparent to the public. Thus, methods of war financing, 
other than direct taxation, bring greater public support for the war and lower institutional 
restraints. Using original experiments conducted in the U.S. and the United Kingdom, 
Flores-Macias and Kreps (2013) found strong support for the argument that the method 
of war finance is an important determinant of public support for war (Flores-Macias & 
Kreps, 2013, p. 4). They argue that borrowing is politically advantageous when compared 
to taxation. Despite an increase in federal debt, the repayment for it starts long after the 
war has ended and the leader who was in charge relinquished his duties (Flores-Macias & 
Kreps, 2013, p. 9). Flores-Macias and Kreps (2013) noted that “conflicts where war taxes 
are absent experience greater levels of support by as much as 16% compared to the 
baseline scenario with debt” (p. 23). Whether the approach of financing war is to increase 
the money supply or sell T-Bills to the public, they both have a political virtue of 
concealing the costs of war.  
Apart from the public support, partisan preferences influence the type of financing 
that the United States will choose. In the modern period, Democrats were more for 
taxation than Republicans (Flores-Macias & Kreps, 2013, p. 31). Their findings also 
show that war duration is affected by the method that government chooses for war 
financing. Taxes did not finance the longest wars since 1960. Mayhew (2005) argues that 
“wars seem to be capable of generating whole new political universes” because they can 
shift the allocation of government resources in the long run. 
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War Cases  
To analyze the impact of different wars authorized by Congress and unilateral acts 
by the president on the economy and financial markets, the rest of the chapter will look at 
individual cases of wars that lasted more than 90 days. The case analysis is conducted on 
four different wars since the 1960s: the Vietnam War, Lebanon War, Persian Gulf War I, 
and the Wars against Iraq and Afghanistan (War on Terror/Operation Enduring 
Freedom). Upon providing background and a brief history of the U.S involvement in 
these particular wars, the impact on the economy and financial markets are observed by 
using a cost analysis, macroeconomic analysis, and qualitative analysis. The cost analysis 
is conducted by looking at the data and impact of military spending and ways of war 
financing. Macroeconomic analysis of each war focuses on observing the impact on 
national output, inflation, interest rates, unemployment and financial markets. Finally, the 
qualitative analysis will include an examination of non-measurable data such as opinions, 
statements, estimations and predictions of economists and political scientists on the 
outcome of the war and its impact. The purpose of this is to investigate whether 
theoretical notions found in qualitative analysis match reports and empirical facts.  
I. Vietnam War 
There are some controversy and debate about the specific date on which the 
Vietnam War started. The origins of Vietnam War can be traced back to late 1950s when 
the French began to colonize the region of Indochina. The Vietnam War was primarily 
fought in South Vietnam between government forces helped by the United States and 
guerrilla groups supported by North Vietnam. The war began after the Geneva 
Conference (1954) divided the country into the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) 
and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam). Even though it started as a 
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civil war, it evolved into a limited international conflict which the United States was 
greatly involved with after August 7, 1964, and did not end until April 30, 1975 (Fischer, 
2004, p. 56). Scholars in politics and international relations hold different views on when 
the Vietnam War started and when the United States got involved in it because of the 
previous conflicts and Cold War military developments. "The Vietnam War began 
without fanfare in the United States, and it was from the outset a very different kind of 
war than the conflicts in recent American memory" (Anderson, 2005, p. 47).  Initially, the 
U.S. provided military help to South Vietnam by sending "military advisors" in 1954-55. 
In 1961, South Vietnam requested bilateral defense treaty with the United States, by 
which the U.S. would grant economic and military aid (Anderson, 2005, p. 47). This 
treaty led to an increase in the numbers of U.S. military forces and the establishment of 
the U.S. Military Assistance Command in 1961-62. U.S. military involvement in the 
Vietnam War increased after Congress passed Tonkin Gulf Resolution in 1964, proposed 
by President Lyndon B. Johnson (Westheider, 2007, p. 23). As costs of the war increased 
and war became unpopular, Congress blamed the executive branch, the President, for the 
U.S. failure to achieve its objectives. The Vietnam War and its costs led to the formation 
of War Powers Resolution, which was an effort to put constraints on president’s ability to 
commit forces overseas.   
If observed from the cost analysis perspective, the Vietnam War was one of the 
most expensive wars in the history of United States. Daggett (2010) presented cost 
estimates of the major wars led by U.S. in his reports to the Congressional Research 
Service. These cost estimates were based on military expenditures, and they do not 
include veteran benefits, interest paid on funds borrowed for war financing, and funds 
spent on the assistance to the U.S. allies (Daggett, 2010, p. 1). He reports these estimates 
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in "current year dollars," inflation-adjusted "constant dollars" for the fiscal year 2011 as 
well as in percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the year where conflict and 
United States' overall defense spending peaked (Daggett, 2010, p. 1). During the Vietnam 
War, Daggett (2010) reported that the U.S. government had spent over $738 billion 
inflation-adjusted "constant dollars" for the fiscal year 2011 (Daggett, 2010, p. 2). From 
the U.S. perspective, the Vietnam War was less expensive than World War II, whose total 
military cost 4,104 738 billion inflation-adjusted "constant dollars" for the fiscal year 
2011 and more expensive than the Korean War and World War II (Daggett, 2010, p. 2). 
When observing the cost of war as a percentage of GDP in the peak year of the war, the 
Vietnam War had the lowest percentage of 2.3% when compared to World War I, World 
War II and Korean War. The cost of Korean War reached 4.2% of GDP in the peak year 
of the war while World War I and World War II war cost was 13.6% and 35.8% of GDP 
during the peak years of these conflicts (Daggett, 2010, p. 2).  The long-lasting Vietnam 
War was exhausting for the United States' economy because it was a great outlay to the 
U.S.  
The Vietnam War is considered to be one of the most important factors for the 
slowdown in the American economic growth in the 1960s. The impact of war on the U.S. 
economy was more drastic than just causing an economic decrease. Just after the Vietnam 
War finished and U.S. troops retreated, the United States economy suffered from an 
extremely large crisis in the 1970s.  Scholars in politics and economics argue that the 
U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War was, at least for some part, responsible for the 
beginning of the 1970s economic crises. Most of the Vietnam War was not funded by 
borrowing money from the public. The majority of the funding, 65 percent, came from 
the expansion of the money supply by the Federal Reserve (Daggett, 2010, p. 2). Only 
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fifteen percent of the Vietnam War was funded by domestic debt, and 20% was funded 
through taxes. Even though an increase in taxes was avoided initially, the government 
decided to raise taxes in 1968 to pay for the war that was longer than anticipated 
(Labonte & Levit, 2008, p. 9).  
Cappella (2012), however, argues that the public opinion was responsible for 
shifting away from taxation to debt and expanding the money supply for funding the war. 
"Public opinion was so low that it shifted President Johnson's war finance strategy away 
from taxation and towards less visible means of domestic debt and printing, resulting in 
painfully high inflation" (Capella, 2012, p. 61).  Labonte and Levit (2008) argued that 
shifting towards expanding the money supply for war financing purposes caused high 
inflation levels after the war ended. Since this government expenditure was used to cover 
both military and non-military outlays, it is difficult to separate the direct effect that the 
Vietnam War had on the budget deficit. However, the military buildup and its 
expenditures seen during this period are the biggest indicators of the war's impact on the 
economy. Daggett (2010) noted that during 1968, the U.S. spent 9.5% of its GDP on 
military costs (p. 2). In 1968, the Vietnamese conflict and cost of war to the U.S. peaked. 
Small military buildup accompanied economic expansion during Vietnam War. 
Economic growth, as a consequence of an increase in government expenditure, can be 
seen in Figure 6. Military buildup during wartime typically boosts aggregate demand 
(Shank, 2011). Reduction in defense expenditures after a war typically causes a brief 
economic shrinkage as the economy adjusts to return to peacetime activities. Scholars 
such as Koubi (2005) argue that major characteristics of wars such as war severity, 
intensity and duration have a positive economic impact (p. 69). In his study, Koubi 
(2005) measured war severity as a number of battle deaths, intensity as the number of 
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deaths that in battles per month, and duration as number of months that the United States 
was involved in a war (Koubi, 2005, p. 73). Findings show that war severity and duration 
have a positive impact on the economic growth during the war (Koubi, 2005, p. 75). The 
total output of the country produced increases during war as specific industries, such as 
technology, increase their production for war purposes. This study explains why there 
was an upward trend in GDP during Vietnam War. 
Figure 6: Government Spending for Vietnam War 
 
Source: Shank, M. (2011). Economic Consequences of War on the U.S. Economy. 
Institute for Economics & Peace. 
Once the war ended, the United States experienced great levels of budget deficit 
and inflation. Critics hold that this was caused by high military expenditure and the 
increase in money supply. The interest rates rose as well. The increase in interest rates 
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was a result of Nixon's policy to establish price controls in order to suppress inflation. As 
Labonte and Levit (2008) noted that "rather than further tighten monetary policy or fiscal 
policy to weaken aggregate demand, President Nixon responded with the imposition of 
price controls in four phases from 1971 to 1974. Under the Nixon program, prices, 
wages, and profits were controlled for all large firms" (p. 10).  President Nixon 
implemented price controls in four phases during which the measures would be gradually 
reduced. The goal of these price controls was to restrict the amount of capital that 
businesses and consumers could access (Labonte & Levit, 2008, p. 11). The 
measurements targeted corporations and labor unions while small firms did not have to 
comply with price, profit, or wage controls for some phases. To decrease inflation the 
government also decreased military spending and government expenditures between 
1969 and 1973 (Shank, 2011, p. 12). As it can be seen from Figure 6, consumption and 
investment remained flat or constant during the Vietnam War. After the Vietnam War 
ended, the U.S. economy experienced an "energy crisis" and stagflation, which is a period 
of high inflation and unemployment levels and low economic growth (Labonte & Levit, 
2008, p. 11). The government’s policy to decrease inflation and unemployment rates after 
the Vietnam War, in contrast, decreased economic growth. To sum up, while the Vietnam 
War had a positive impact on the economy during the war, the American economy 
experienced negative effects after the war ended because of the increase in money supply 
and budget deficit.  
As the conflict progressed, the investors and financial markets were less affected 
by conflicts and battles in Vietnam. As Ferguson (2008) argued "Vietnam never 
threatened to become a world war; its primary economic significance was in loosening 
American fiscal and monetary policy and sowing seeds of higher inflation. Likewise, the 
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Middle Eastern conflicts of the 1970s were interpreted by investors primarily in terms of 
their inflationary impact, rather than their potential to escalate to Armageddon" (p. 472). 
Investors paid great attention to domestic monetary and fiscal policy. These policies were 
their main subject of observations as they hoped to improve their predictions in financial 
markets. Uneven inflation rates during the Vietnam War decreased the accuracy of 
investors’ predictions and estimations (Shank, 2011, p. 11).  During this ten-year long 
war, the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index fluctuated. High inflation, Nixon's price 
controls policy, and the oil shock depressed the financial market, and the DJIA index 
stagnated throughout the period. The price of the DJIA increased only after the jump in 
stock prices after 1980 (Shank, 2011, p. 11). Thus, returns from the equity markets were 
worse during the Vietnam War than the full period or full market cycle average. In 
conclusion, many scholars say that Vietnam War had some negative effects, having 
ushered in a decade of both high inflation and economic stagnation in most of the 
Western World. 
II. Lebanon War 
The war in Lebanon started on June 6, 1982, between Israel Defense Forces and 
Palestine Liberation Organization in southern Lebanon (Office of the Historian, 2013). It 
was not until September 29, 1982, however, that President Reagan sent American troops 
as he feared that the conflict could evolve into Arab- Israeli War (Office of the Historian, 
2013). The United States troops withdrew from Lebanon February 26, 1984 (Office of 
the Historian, 2013). Initially, the United States troops were sent to Lebanon by President 
Reagan's unilateral authorization. As reported by the U.S. Department of State, Office of 
Historian, "Reagan's administration was divided over how to respond to Israel's invasion" 
(Office of the Historian, 2013). Even though these disagreements were substantial, 
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Reagan ignored them by sending U.S. troops as part of three-nation peacekeeping force, 
including troops from France and Italy. "On September 29, Congress passed legislation 
invoking the War Powers Act and authorizing the Marines to remain in Lebanon for 18 
months, the first time constraint placed on their presence" (Office of the Historian, 2013). 
The war in Lebanon is considered to be an example of Congress applying the War 
Powers Resolution with ex-post authorization for a limited war of maximum 18 months. 
If the president had failed to invoke the Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, 
Congress would have stopped funding the military actions in Lebanon. The announced 
goal was to secure restoration of the Lebanese government sovereignty by guaranteeing 
withdrawal of Palestine Liberation Organization (Fisher, 2000, p. 67). "What began as a 
humanitarian, peacekeeping, noncombatant mission deteriorated into war, stretching from 
its initial 30-day commitment to almost two years" (Fischer, 2000, p. 68).   
While the United States suffered significant losses in lives and resources, there is 
no data showing the exact financial costs or military spending during this period. The 
New York Times (1984) reports that "the estimated participation in the Multinational 
Forces for fiscal year 1984 was a total of $14.6 million for the U.S. Marine Corps 
deployment, $44.9 million for U.S. Navy support and $243 thousands for U.S. Army 
support.” Compared to the Vietnam War and previous U.S. involvement in military 
conflicts, this cost was low. It is unlikely that funds for this military outlay were acquired 
through additional taxes because the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 was enacted 
towards the end of August 1981, which was less than a year before the U.S. troops were 
sent to Lebanon (Labonte & Levit,  2008, p. 14). This act was created in order "to amend 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to encourage economic growth through reduction of 
the tax rates for individual taxpayers, acceleration of capital cost recovery of investment 
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in plant, equipment, and real property, and incentives for savings, and for other purposes" 
(Public Law 97-34, p. 1). Starting a war in 1982 was unfavorable because of this act and 
economic recession that was worse than the average of post-World War II recessions. 
Towards the end of 1982, the U.S. economy also witnessed extremely high inflation rates 
reaching the post-World War high of 10.8 percent (Miller, Mitchel, & Hoxworth, 1983, 
p. 5). The U.S. economy began to recover in 1983, from the 1970s energy crisis. This was 
several months after the war in Lebanon started, but it is not possible to distinguish the 
impact of war on the economy from the implications of the 1981 Economic Recovery 
Act. The civilian unemployment rate dropped steadily, reaching 8.4 percent in November 
1983 (Miller, Mitchel, & Hoxworth, 1983, p. 5). Rapid growth through 1983 was 
followed by even more rapid growth in the first half of 1984, accompanied by further 
declines in the unemployment rate and continued moderation in inflation. After mid-
1984, economic growth slowed significantly and the unemployment rate leveled off while 
inflation remained moderate (Miller, Mitchel, & Hoxworth, 1983, p. 5). Early in the year, 
there was a rapid increase in the interest rates and money growth which was followed by 
decreasing interest rates and slow money growth. Monetary policy was implemented in 
1984 against inflation and towards continued growth in the economy at a sustainable 
pace.  
Again inflation affected financial markets and the share prices were rising on 
average. While stock prices were undervalued in the 1970s, the U.S. stock market entered 
on August 1982 one of the longest bullish periods since its creation. Many scholars argue 
that during the U.S. involvement in the Lebanese War, the financial markets recovered 
from "inflation-induced valuation errors" that were created before the war (Ritter and 
Warr, 2002, p. 30).  
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III. Persian Gulf War I 
The Persian Gulf War, also known as Operation Desert Storm, was an 
international conflict that began after Iraq struck Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and ended 
February 28, 1991 (Fisher, 2004, p. 9). It was the briefest full-scale conflict in the history 
of United States. The United States intervened in this dispute as it did not approve the 
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq's leader, Saddam Hussein. His immediate goal was to conquer 
the nation's mass oil reserves, expand the power of Iraq in the region and remove a debt 
that Iraq owed to Kuwait (Joyner, 1990, p. 10). The coalition force authorized by United 
Nations consisted of NATO allies and the Middle Eastern countries of Saudi Arabia, 
Syria and Egypt. This coalition was U.S.-led. Its formation was officially authorized by 
the United Nations Security Council on November 29, 1990, where it was approved to 
use of "all necessary means" in a war against Iraq (Joyner, 1990, p. 10). While the United 
Nations authorized the use of force earlier, it was not until January 14, 1991, that the U.S. 
Congress approved the use of U.S. military force by passing the "Authorization for Use 
of Military Force against Iraq Resolution” (Fisher, 2004, p. 9). Even though the 
authorization came late, the Persian Gulf War I had the most explicit authorization since 
the Vietnam War and Tonkin Gulf Resolution (Tucker, Roberts, & Zinni, 2010, p. 343). 
The Congressional Research Service and the United States Department of 
Defense estimated that the cost of the Persian Gulf War I was 102 billion "real dollars" 
for the actual fiscal cost in the year 2011 (Daggett, 2010, p. 2). The conflict occurred at 
the end of "Cold War" which was the time when United States government was reducing 
military expenditure as a percentage of GDP. This was one of the few military operations 
that did not affect the budget. The peak year for military spending during the Gulf War 
was 1991, where war needed only 4.6% of its GDP for war financing that year (Daggett, 
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2010, p. 5).  
Another reason this operation did not require much funding from the U.S. 
government is the fact that the U.S. received many financial contributions for the Gulf 
War from its allies. "During the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. received huge subsidies from 
Germany, the Gulf states, Japan and Saudi Arabia to help pay for the cost of evicting 
Saddam Hussein from Kuwait" (Roach, 2003, p. 10). Critics hold the U.S. earned a profit 
from participating in the Gulf War as the country funding from their allies in the 
multinational force for their military material. These contributions from foreign 
governments equaled to $48 billion while the overall cost of the war was $61 billion in 
current nominal dollars (Smith, 1989, p. 347). In the balance of payments from 1990 to 
1992, which is an official statement that reports all of the economic transactions that the 
United States had with the rest of the world, these contributions represented a single, one-
way, transfer to the United States and were recorded as a reduction in the current account 
deficit. Ultimately, these transactions had no effect on the exchange rate, since the largest 
amount of funds came from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait which had de facto fixed exchange 
rate with the U.S. dollar.  
 During the Persian Gulf War, the budget deficit increased. It is debatable, 
however, whether the Persian Gulf War was behind this since there was a decreasing 
trend in the military spending. Labonte and Levit (2008) argued that increase in budget 
deficit resulted in "falling tax revenues, and rising non-military outlays, both of which 
can be largely accounted for by automatic changes in revenues and outlays caused by the 
economic slowdown" (p. 14). The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 cut 
discretionary spending and increased taxes (Labonte & Levit,  2008, p. 14). This act was 
an attempt to secure long-term growth of the American economy. Most of the cuts in 
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spending were in the military and Medicare area.  "The revenue raising provisions of the 
act were estimated to raise tax revenues by 0.3% of GDP in 1991” (Labonte & Levit, 
2008, p. 14) 
According to Congressional Research Service report by Labonte and Levit  
(2008), the Persian Gulf War had adverse effects on the U.S. economy. During this 
period, the United States economy underwent a recession, which started in July 1990 and 
ended March 1991.  While scholars hold that recession of 1990 did not directly influence 
the war, there is a possibility that war decreased consumer confidence (Labonte & Levit,, 
2008, p. 13). While this recession was influenced by an event called Black Monday, 
when various stock markets around the globe plunged, many scholars thought that the 
recession was a sign that investors were worried about large amounts of budget deficits. 
Other causes of this crisis were considered to be the Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and 
Federal Reserve's contractionary monetary policy designed to increase interest rates. 
During the Persian Gulf War I, the U.S. government had to choose whether to 
fight the recession or get rid of the inflation caused by a rise in oil prices. The spike in oil 
prices in 1990 is correlated with the recent invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. "After the loss of 
Iraqi and Kuwaiti supplies, oil prices initially soared from a pre-invasion average price 
around $18 a barrel to slightly above $40 by the late fall" (Silk, 1991). However, Silk 
(1991) stated that the oil prices "fell back to roughly $21, as numerous shipments came in 
from other producers, and world oil demand lagged." Some of the industries that were 
negatively affected during this period were the airline industry because of the rise in fuel 
prices. The Persian Gulf War had a negative effect on consumer confidence and business 
spending.  After the war had ended, the economy began to expand, and there was no sign 
of the previous contradiction. Levkovich claims that "the market cheered the Gulf War 
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partially because decisive victory came at relatively low cost to American lives" 
(Waggoner & Shell, 2002). 
There were different views on the global and domestic economic impact of the 
Persian Gulf War. The war was not considered to pose any danger to the world economy 
and cause a global recession unless it evolved into a long-lasting or large-scale war. 
Lester Thurow, a professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
said at the annual World Economic Forum meeting in Switzerland that the Gulf War is a 
less significant economic war because it is an “inventory war" (Heilbroner & Thurow, 
1998). Nearly three weeks into the Persian Gulf War, political and economic leaders 
believed that the conflict would only have limited impact on a world economy already 
expected to slow down this year. On the other hand, the Gulf War was considered to have 
triggered or at least intensified the American economic decline.  
Right before United States' invasion, Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal 
Reserve, warned of the potential dangers of recession and said that the Federal Reserve 
was prepared to ease credit, if necessary, to prevent a recession. However, other 
economists said before the Gulf War started, that the Fed had been too tight and was 
endangering a weak economy. Director of the President's Council of Economic Advisers 
at the time, Michael J. Boskin, is quoted as saying that “as the Gulf War tipped the 
economy into recession, its end helped stop the recession and start the recovery. The 
council is forecasting 3.6 percent real economic growth in 1991" (Silk, 1991). 
The Persian Gulf War I was criticized for pushing the United States economy 
towards a recession (Silk, 1991). While this war is considered to be a quick victory, the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait produced an unfavorable psychological response in stock prices 
and consumer attitude. One factor for the decrease in stock prices, intensification of 
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inflation and recession was the disruption in oil markets (Silk, 1991).  Even though the 
1990s oil crises was not extreme, the oil prices initially increased from $18 to $40 per 
barrel by the fall in 1990 (Silk, 1991). This oil price increase affected many industries in 
the United States, such as airlines. Businesses decreased the amount of investment, which 
lowered the valuation of their stocks by investors. These factors depressed consumer 
spending while defense spending did not make for it. The outcome was uncommon for 
United States wartime in modern history. The sudden recession began one month after 
the Iraq invaded Kuwait.  
IV. War in Afghanistan/ Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraq (War on Terror) 
Operation Enduring Freedom began as an international military operation against 
terrorism on October 7, 2011, which was quickly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attacks (Tucker, Roberts, & Zinni, 2010). Close allies, such as United Kingdom, 
Australia, and Canada, supported the United States in this operation as well as NATO 
that joined in 2003. Their immediate goal was to remove Al-Qaeda and Taliban groups 
from power in Afghanistan. Even though NATO formally ended combat operations on 
December 28, 2014, and the United States transferred full responsibility to the 
government of Afghanistan, U.S. troops are still in the process of withdrawal from the 
Afghanistan soil today (Tucker, Roberts, & Zinni, 2010). Thus, the war in Afghanistan is 
considered to be an ongoing conflict. Even after the end of Operation Enduring Freedom, 
in December 2014 the United States military forces still continued their military 
operations, this time functioning under a different name, Operation Freedom Sentinel. 
The use of force in this war was approved by Congress through a resolution called 
"Authorization for Use of Military Force" that was passed on September 14, 2001 
(Tucker, Roberts, & Zinni, 2010). This resolution authorized the president to "use all 
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necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations or persons he 
determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001" (United States Congress, 2001, p. 1).  
As this war was a long-lasting war, it is hard to determine the exact impact that 
the war had on the economy and financial markets. The United States, however, spent 
many resources to conduct this war. Since this was a serious issue that affected the whole 
nation, Congress authorized immediately much bigger funds towards counterterrorist 
operations. Daggett (2010) noted that until 2010 the United States spent in total $1,046 
billion on military outlays in Iraq or Afghanistan after 9/11 Terrorist Attacks (p. 2). The 
year of 2008 is considered to be the peak year of conflict and defense spending in Iraq or 
Afghanistan from 2001 until 2010. The government spent around 4.3% of its GDP on 
financing military expenditures only (Daggett, 2010, p. 1). Scholars, such as Stiglitz and 
Bilmes (2011) argued that, after accounting for the associated costs that were omitted in 
the Congressional Service Report, the cost of conducting Operation Enduring Freedom 
was more than three trillion dollars (Stiglitz & Bilmes, 2011). The most recent critics 
hold that the total costs of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are more than four trillion dollars 
(Farber, 2015). Just like the Persian Gulf War I, this war began with a recession in the 
United States. While this war was not responsible for the crisis, it impacted the recovery 
by slowing it down. 
Because of the weak economy, the United States used other ways of financing for 
the war. Unlike the Vietnam War, which was financed by increases in taxes, this war was 
funded by raising debt. Instead of raising taxes, this was the first war that started with the 
government lowering the tax rates. The goal of this was to avoid protests and keep the 
public satisfied and supportive of the war (Bartlett, 2009). Even though the government 
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did not expect that raising debt will impact the current weak economy, increase in debt 
ended up raising deficits. Higher deficits resulted in higher debt, higher debt-to-GDP 
ratio, and higher interest rates. The widening of the budget deficit usually stimulates 
aggregate demand during wartime, but since military spending increased at a constant 
rate each year, the effect was negligible. Apart from these effects, increasing the deficit 
had many adverse effects on the economy as well. Despite the increases in military 
spending and deficits, the inflation and interest rate levels did not increase in the 
beginning. They remained flat until the end of the recession. Since this was a long-lasting 
war, there were occasions when interest rose, such as between 2005 and 2009. During 
this period, the government also attempted to use taxes for financing the war. Labonte 
and Levit (2008) noted that the reason for United States revenue increase from 2005 until 
2007 was a result of "rising taxable income generated as a result of strong GDP growth, 
contributing to lower deficits and allowing the war to be financed through this increase in 
revenues" (Labonte & Levit, 2008, p. 16). The slowing economy in 2008 decreased 
incomes and the United States went back to funding the war through deficit. After 2009 
and the recession caused by the housing bubble, interest rates had a decreasing pattern. 
On the other hand, the level of unemployment increased significantly towards the fourth 
quarter of 2009.  
"While the Dow Jones index plunged 6.31 percent following the invasion of 
Kuwait by Iraqi troops in 1990, it gained 17 percent in the first four weeks of Operation 
Desert Storm" (Schnieder & Troeger, 2007, p. 624). Stiglitz and Bilmes (2011) claimed 
that this war "played a direct role in increasing the cost of oil which went from $23 a 
barrel just before the war to $140 at its peak" (p. 16). A weak economy concealed the 
inflation rates in U.S. policymakers started using fiscal policy to improve the state of the 
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economy just before the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. With this fiscal policy, "the 
Federal Reserve carried the burden of keeping the economy growing, which it did via low 
interest rates, a flood of liquidity and lax banking regulations which in turn helped fuel 
the housing bubble" (Shank, 2011, p. 12).  
If compared to figures from World War II period, defense spending remained 
moderate during Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Teslik (2008) arguesd that, apart from 
defense spending, there are other collateral economic consequences such as international 
debt accrued to sustain war, volatility in the global and domestic oil markets which is 
widely attributed to conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the geopolitical uncertainty 
resulting from this war.  Experts disagree on whether U.S. war spending in Iraq and 
Afghanistan will have a positive or negative impact on the economy in the long run. 
While Douglas Holtz-Eakin, former director of CBO and advisor to former presidential 
candidate Senator John McCain said that this war has an effect on the "business cycle if it 
caused higher oil prices, slower U.S. growth and diminished global income” (Holtz-
Eakin, 2006). On the contrary, Martin Feldstein, an economist from Harvard and 
economic advisor to President Reagan, claimed in 2002 that the United States can slightly 
increase the budget without it having a negative effect on the economy (Teslik, 2008).  
Political scientists consider this war to be "prolonged conflict" where there are a 
wide variety of complications and additional costs. Garten (2004) argued that "the biggest 
danger, and the most difficult to quantify, is that a long and arduous war will add to the 
investor and consumer unease that has already been building in many parts of the world, 
particularly in the middle class in America and Western Europe." The length of the 
conflict and additional resources used in wars that last longer than expected should make 
a bigger impact on the economy. 
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Conclusion 
Two types of wars led by the United States, congressionally authorized wars and 
unilateral acts by the president, determine the length of the war as well as the costs.  
Based on the type of war, the United States must choose between three primary ways of 
war funding: taxation, issuance of T-bills to the public or creation of money. Each of 
these methods of war financing has different political and economic effects. Wars 
financed through taxation are politically unpopular, but this method tends to fight 
inflation and minimize costs. Issuing T-Bills can cause higher dependence on foreign 
countries but can disguise the direct costs of war to the public. Thus, the method for war 
finance depends on different factors such as public and legal war support, current 
economic condition, war intensity and the duration of war. These factors consequently 
determine whether the war will have a positive or negative impact on the economy. 
Because most of the wars since 1960 were financed by issuing T-bills to the public, the 
effect on the U.S. economy was positive during the war. Critics hold, however, that after 
the war ends, the risk of recessions and stock market crises is increased.   
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Chapter 3: War and its Impact 
Economic causes and consequences of war have received widespread attention 
from scholars, and there is only limited research done on how war affects the stock 
market. Most studies conclude that the consequences of war on the financial market are 
substantial. However, there is a divide in literature as to whether war and movements in 
Dow Jones Industrial Average index are negatively or positively related, with the reasons 
stemming from differing empirical approaches, different datasets over different periods, 
and the use of various descriptive variables. To explain the conflicting stock market 
reactions to war the chapter will observe the impact of the war during different stages: 
pre-war period, war period and post-war period. Apart from this, short conflicts such as 
terrorist attacks will be analyzed as well. 
War as a shock 
The literature on the behavior of financial markets has shown that equity markets 
experience different shocks. Shocks are considered to be periods "when unanticipated 
volatility in U.S. stock markets was exceptionally high in statistical terms" (Mehl, 2013, 
p. 2).  The European Central Bank divides the shocks into two categories based on their 
nature: economic and non-economic (Mehl, 2013, p. 2). The economic shocks on 
financial markets are fiscal and economic crises, economic policies, financial market 
panics and concerns over economic policies and government responses to crises. Some 
examples of the non-economic shocks are terrorist attacks, wars and other political 
shocks. Mehl (2013) sees non-economic shocks to be exogenous in nature, meaning that 
their shocks origin is outside the U.S. borders. Economic shocks originate inside the U.S. 
and thus are endogenous to the U.S. financial markets. To other foreign markets, the U.S. 
commercial shocks are exogenous in nature.  Mehl (2013) also looked at the wartime 
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events as exogenous developments that can become relevant for the financial markets (p. 
2). The United States has fought all of its wars on foreign soil since the end of the 
American Civil War in 1985. Despite war shocks originating outside the U.S., the 
location of conflicts still matters. 
Taleb (2007) argued that the war events belong to a type of shock that is called a 
"black swan," a term used to describe any event that differs from the standard 
expectations about a situation and that would be tough to predict (Taleb, 2017, p. xvii). 
Outliers, such as wars, have an extreme impact on market returns.  They are outside of 
the scope of general expectations, meaning that nothing from the past is indicating that a 
"black swan" will occur in the future. After the occurrence of a "black swan," it is 
possible to find justifications that make the events explainable and predictable (Taleb, 
2007, p. xvii). Thus, when looking at these events retrospectively, Taleb (2007) did not 
consider the war events to be a surprise. To explain how the term "black swans" 
represents wars, Taleb (2007) looked at multiple war events (such as Lebanese War, 
September 11, 2001, World War I and terrorist attacks).  
The effect of "black swans" was measured by looking at financial market 
performance indicators. Charles and Darne (2013) expanded on Taleb's research and used 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average index to look at the effect of wars, bankruptcy and 
terrorist attacks on financial markets. They consider these three events to be "black 
swans." To identify the "black swan" events, Charles and Darne (2013) took a particular 
approach to the identification process (p. 188). Unlike Taleb (2007), who looked at 
qualitative criteria for the identification process, Charles and Darne (2013) used a 
quantitative technique to identify these outliers (p. 190). Their categorization of the war 
shocks can be viewed as more reliable than Taleb's since it satisfies the research goal of 
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detecting the biggest outliers in the period and can be reproduced again with similar 
results. Charles and Darne (2013) used two techniques: intervention analysis and event 
study methodology (p. 192). The event study methodology is used to identify and 
measure the impact of an event on security prices and stock returns (MacKinlay, 1997, p. 
14). With this method, all of the abnormal returns generated from the difference in stock 
prices are attributed to the event. By using the intervention analysis approach, researchers 
were able to estimate the effect of the known and unknown events in a time series data 
(Charles & Darne, 2013, p. 191). In their study, they observed these "black swan" events 
that cause large shocks to financial markets through changes in the volatility of the DJIA 
index in the period between October 2, 1928, and August 30, 2013 (Charles & Darne, 
2013, p. 195). The iterative cumulative sums of squares (ICSS) algorithm proposed by 
Inclan and Tiao (1994) was used by Charles and Darne (2013) to identify sudden shifts in 
the volatility of the Dow Jones Industrial Average index. After the identification of the 
volatility changes, they studied the effect of "black swans" by using a new semi-
parametric test based on the conditional heteroscedasticity model. The findings from their 
research show that large shocks occur mostly because of the events such as financial 
crashes, US elections, wars, monetary policy during recessions, macroeconomic news 
and declarations about the economic situation, terrorist attack, bankruptcy and regulations 
(Charles & Darne, 2013, p. 193). The occasions where "black swans" did not have an 
impact on financial markets were justified by the fact that the events occurred during the 
period of high market volatility (Charles & Darne, 2013, p. 191). As these large 
movements occur due to investors' perception of the shocks, the changes in the 
percentage of market return have different consequences and perceptions when the 
market is within a high volatility period compared with a low volatility or stable period. 
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The percentage change in performance, caused by a shock, can be considered a 
significant shock when the market is experiencing low volatility. The shock can also 
indicate an insignificant effect during the high volatility periods in the market. Thus, 
some shocks were not identified as unusual movements, especially in the high volatility 
periods such as 1929-1934, 1937-1938 and 2007-2011 (Charles & Darne, 2013, p. 195). 
Figure 7 depicts both high volatility and low volatility changes in DJIA in the period 
from 1928 until 2013. It shows a conditional variance of the U.S. financial market for 
each of the sub-periods. Consequences of "black swans" and investor's perceptions differ 
from periods of high to periods of low volatility and thus it is critical to consider 
instability of the period prior assessing the effect of the extraordinary shock such as war. 
The volatility of stock returns increases when the economy enters a state of recession. 
"Episodes of higher volatility which occurred in the 1929-1934 and 1937-1938 periods, 
with a standard deviation of 0.020, present at least twice the volatility as the other 
periods" (Mehl, 2013, p. 22). However, this high volatility can also be attributed partially 
to political uncertainty. The period between 2007 and 2011 experienced lower levels of 
volatility than the period between 1929 and 1924. However, the volatility remained 
relatively high for a longer period. 
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Figure 7: Conditional Volatility of DJIA, 1928-2013  
 
 
 
 
Source: Charles A. and Darne O. (2013).  Large shocks in the volatility of the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average index: 1928-2013, Journal of Banking and Finance. 
Apart from the Dow Jones Industrial Index, other indicators were used to measure 
the effect of war on financial markets. Researchers made decisions on which parameters 
to use based on their field of practice and intuition. For example, Shank (2011), an 
economist from the Institute for Economics and Peace, looked at the relationship between 
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government spending and war since World War II. His study looked at the 
macroeconomic effects of WWII, the Korean War, the Iraq/Afghanistan Wars and the 
Vietnam War. To analyze the effect of wars on the economy of the United States, Shank 
(2011) used economic parameters and indicators such as GDP, public debt, levels of 
taxation, consumption and investment as a percentage of GDP, inflation, income 
distribution and average stock market valuations (Shank, 2011, p. 4). All of these 
indicators were affected by government policies associated with funding these conflicts. 
According to Keynes, an increase in government spending increases Aggregate Demand 
and consumption, which raises levels of productions and accelerates recovery from 
recessions. “The expansion in government spending shifts the demand schedule facing 
each firm, and thus the possibility of selling more output at an unchanged price” (Gali, 
Lopez-Salido, & Valles, 2002, p. 19). Government spending is also an element of GDP, 
which is one of the primary indicators of the state of the economy. Government spending 
during war periods increases since the state is funding for military actions through 
various government policies, such as increasing the public debt and levels of taxation. 
Shank (2011) defined this increase in government spending as "conflict spending boom" 
that generates positive economic benefit in the short-term period (Shank, 2011, p. 5). 
Despite having a positive impact on the economy, the effects that war has on financial 
market are more mixed. "During World War II stock markets did initially fall but 
recovered before its end, during the Korean War there were no major corrections while 
during the Vietnam War, and afterward stock markets remained flat from the end of 1964 
until 1982" (Shank, 2011, p. 4). When looking at wars as a whole, there was no consistent 
pattern of effect across various events. Thus, Shank (2011) went a step further and 
discovered that the impact of the war was negative on stock prices for a period before the 
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markets recover from the shock. "In 14 shocks dating (back) to the attack on Pearl Harbor 
in December 1941, the median one-day decline has been 2.4%. The shocks, which also 
include the September 11th terror attacks and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, lasted eight 
days, with total losses of 7.4%…The market recouped its losses 14 days later" (Shell, 
2014, March 3). 
Another important observation from Shank (2011) is that short-term shocks to the 
system cause short-term consequences for the stock market and the economy. The impact 
of short conflicts, or terrorist attacks such as September 11, is short-lived. "As such they 
shouldn't change an individual's investment philosophy or cause one to "abandon ship" 
(Aune, 2014, p. 5).  On the other hand, crucial periods of conflict, such as wars between 
the United States and another country or World Wars, can have more lasting effects on 
the economy and the stock market. "A more prolonged conflict may cause an individual 
to take a more judicious approach by reevaluating his or her goals and making 
adjustments based on the current market environment" (Aune, 2014, p. 5). Thus, Shank 
(2011) and Aune (2014) classify the impact of war based on the duration or type of war. 
A crucial component while analyzing the impact of war is time. Based on the period that 
a researcher is looking at, the indicators of financial market performance, such as Dow 
Jones Industrial Average index, vary. Dow Jones Industrial Average index is a time-
tested measurement of the market that changes with fundamental market trends. Thus, to 
get a more detailed analysis of the stock market performance pre-war, during the war and 
post-war periods will be observed.   
Pre-war period effect 
The pre-war period here is the period before every war in the history led by the 
United States. From Gordon's (1986) perspective, the average duration of the prewar 
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period is considered to be around ten years before the war starts. However, there is no 
precise time frame which defines the pre-war, and it varies from one war case to another. 
This definition of pre-war period is different from a standard definition by which pre-war, 
or antebellum, is a period before the most significant or most recent war in the history of 
culture (Thompson, 2015, p. 64). Unlike observing the social or political system change, 
researchers have looked at the pre-war period to see whether it brings a change to the 
financial market in the United States. It can be argued that this pre-war period is a phase 
of "normal" state of affairs which is in contrast to the postwar period of "exceptional" 
price stickiness (Gordon, 1986, p. 668). Financial markets are considered to be in the 
natural state of affairs when they reflect all publicly available information. Thus, the 
efficient market hypothesis is a representation of the normal state. As stock prices reflect 
all available information, according to the efficient market hypothesis, they do not react 
quickly to news. This delayed reaction indicates that the prices are not sticky in the 
period where financial markets are efficient (Gordon, 1986, p. 668). One must be careful 
with this statement since there is limited evidence of price stickiness in the prewar period 
as well. To investigate the effect of war on United States' financial market, two types of 
information sources were used: history and news. Because the data on war is limited in 
the prewar period, the measurement error has to be taken into consideration when looking 
at any study conducted in the prewar period.   
Since current market prices reflect complete knowledge and expectations of 
investors, any information released to the public influences the prices. In the prewar 
period, when there is no accurate information people get affected by the common 
perception in the investment world.  Investors create common perception when relevant 
information to financial markets is perceived by investors with senses instead of as they 
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are. These acts of perceiving in the investment world can become reality. Conflict 
developments or situations from the past are a base for investors' perceptions of present 
conditions and circumstances. That is why history is important in the financial markets. 
The lessons that investors extract from history about the impact of the major geopolitical 
shocks on financial markets influence their investment decisions made in the present 
(Ferguson, 2008, p. 431). Ferguson (2008) looked at two financial markets, the London 
and New York market for bonds, stocks, currencies and commodities during three major 
wars: the First World War, Second World War and early Cold War. He compares the 
behavior of investors during these world wars to see whether the previous war impacted 
the future one. This study done by Ferguson (2008) is more of a qualitative study of the 
effect of war on the financial markets, rather than a quantitative study. His exploratory 
research provides the reader with an insight into the war shock and helps the reader to 
understand the importance of wars for the investors and financial markets.  
Throughout his research, Ferguson (2008) investigated the importance of political 
risk, which is a component of war. Political risk is a type of risk that investors, 
governments or corporations bear when there is a potential that investment returns will be 
affected by instabilities or political changes in a country. The risk is expected to increase 
once the country enters a war. Ferguson (2008) investigated whether the political risk in 
financial markets in the past can explain the way past wars effect on the developments in 
the present. Unlike other researchers, Ferguson (2008) argued that political risk should be 
taken into consideration when investigating financial markets during wars and economic 
crises, even though the financial crisis frequently occur for no geopolitical reasons (p. 
436). The increase in political risk increases market volatility and reduces investment 
because war announcement influences the overall suitability of a destination for 
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investment. His theory of why political risk is an important factor when analyzing the 
effect of war on financial markets comes from his analysis of similarities between the 
world in 2008 and the world in 1914. In 1914 and 2008, the U.S. economy was 
exceedingly more integrated with the international economy, which meant the free 
movement of labor, goods, and capital. According to Ferguson (2008), both the crisis in 
1914 and 2008 “prompted the issue of emergency paper money by the national treasury" 
(p. 448). Apart from similarities in the economy, the world experienced some radical and 
capitalist ideologies and terrorist movements, as well as regimes willing to sponsor 
terrorism with the hopes that the great powers might come into conflict with less 
powerful states (Ferguson, 2008, p. 448).  Despite these similarities, the markets seemed 
to be indifferent about the political risk and the similarity to the previous war scenario. 
Instead, the differences between the two wars (such as technological advances, 
improvements in communication and free trade) seem to be more meaningful to the 
investor. Thus, they choose to ignore the lessons of history about the political risk and the 
threat to financial stability.  
Lessons from the previous wars are limited to the investor because different wars 
use various means, technologies and techniques. For example, the World Wars were the 
largest and most destructive wars in the history, while the Cold War never evolved into a 
physical conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, during the 
Cold War, more destructive weapons, nuclear weapons, had been developed than the 
ones used in the two World Wars. The core argument of Ferguson's paper is that 
"investors tried to learn from the history in the 1930s but they only learned how to make 
new mistakes, because the lessons learned from the previous wars seemed to have limited 
relevance to the new war" (Ferguson, 2008, p.441). According to this, investors tend to 
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overlook the effects of the war in history because they look and learn only from relatively 
recent events. They also often concentrate on fighting the last war and analyzing why the 
market reacted as it did rather than fighting the next one or predicting the future 
movements in the financial market. As a consequence of their concentration in the past, 
investors made numerous mistakes such as failing "to anticipate the huge liquidity crisis 
unleashed by the First World War" (Ferguson, 2008, p. 472). Again, Ferguson (2008) 
claimed that these mistakes happened because investors took into account the differences 
between the two World Wars and the Cold War.  Shifts in military, technology and 
regulatory regimes reduce the relevance of experience as investors argue that different 
wars have a different impact on the financial market (Ferguson, 2008, p. 436).  "Changes 
in military technology and government regulation ensured that one could never be certain 
that the next war would have the same financial impact as the previous war" (Ferguson, 
2008, p. 472). These differences between the World War I and II and the Cold War need 
to be taken into consideration when looking at the investors' behavior. Even though 
investors looked at World Wars retrospectively, the difficulty is the small sample size of 
big wars and the tendency for military paradigms to shift dramatically between wars. 
Thus, Ferguson's arguments are relevant only to an extent because there is a great amount 
of speculation involved when generalizing the impact of wars of different scales. 
In the prewar period, media has a causal impact on investors' perceptions and 
financial markets. Apart from history, news released by various media on a constant 
basis, also influence investors’ opinions. Even though they may sound irrelevant, the 
professionals and financial analysts evaluate every piece of news released to the public 
because they can impact the financial markets. In the prewar period, speculations about 
potential conflict or war can be observed months before the conflict starts. Rigobon and 
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Sack (2005) measured the effects of war-related news on U.S. financial markets and 
markets reaction to information about the likelihood of war and its expected duration and 
success. The study observed the risk associated with war in Iraq on various U.S. financial 
variables using a heteroscedasticity based estimation technique. The period observed in 
the paper was January to April 2003. The factor that researchers called "war risk" was 
measured by the quantity of war-related news published on a particular date. There were 
21 "war days" which are defined as dates on which the war-related events appeared to be 
the biggest influencers of the asset prices (Rigobon & Sack, 2005, p. 2). The sign of the 
news, positive or negative was not determined because of the subjectivity issue. Despite 
the challenge to quantify the actual "war risk," the impact of it was still observable. The 
econometric method used to obtain the result was homoscedasticity. 
The results indicate that "increases in war risk caused declines in Treasury yields 
and equity prices, a widening of lower-grade corporate spreads, a fall in the dollar, and a 
rise in oil prices" (Rigobon & Sack, 2005, p. 3). War risk factor explained substantial 
portions of change in return on these financial variables. "War risk described 12 to 56 
percent of the variances in the financial variables cumulative movements over the period 
observed" (Rigobon & Sack, 2005, p. 6). Overall, major wars would cause higher 
inflation which would lead to larger commodity prices (Ferguson, 2008, p. 468). In 
general, it has been found that, while news releases result in a rapid increase of volatility, 
most of the effect is short-lived and subsidies within the first few minutes (Rigobon & 
Sack, 2005, p. 3). "War risk" did not have an effect on gold prices or liquidity premiums 
for "on-the-run" Treasury securities, which are the most current issues of U.S. Treasury 
securities (Rigobon & Sack, 2005, p. 3). The "off-the-run" treasuries refer to Treasury 
bonds and notes that released before the most recent issue, are still outstanding and trade 
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at a discount (Wilson, 2014). These on/off the run government bonds are traded based on 
yield and liquidity differentials. Endowment and public shocks would make these 
differentials bigger and increase trade. However, the price or speed of the government 
bonds exchange was not influenced by the "war risk" factor. 
 Several issues can pose limitations on the results obtained in this study. 
Primarily, there were complications with the measurement of the "war risk" variable. 
When referring to the measurement issue, Rigobon and Sack (2005) stated two problems 
that their paper has. The first one was that the risk is an unobservable variable since it is 
hard to quantify the news associated with war. The second problem is that there are 
factors other than "war risk" that are influencing these financial variables (Rigobon & 
Sack, 2005, p. 8). Because other factors of influence exist, the "war risk" factor alone 
may not have affected investors' behavior to change towards safer and more liquid assets. 
Rigobon and Sack's results show that even after including other factors, the "war risk" 
factor was still a substantial share of the variances of many financial variables. Apart 
from this, it is also difficult to interpret the "war risk" factor. Even though they were 
looking at the news to define the "war risk" variable, it is impossible to determine which 
war-related news impacted the stock market and why.  
In conclusion, the effect of war in the pre-war period can be observed by using 
history and news. Investors take only limited lessons from history as they focus more on 
learning from fairly recent events. Instead, differences in military, technology and 
regulatory regimes of countries indicate to investors that different wars will have 
different effect on returns from equity markets. News from media influences the stock 
market by indicating the likelihood of war, or the war risk. While news may have a short-
lived effect on financial markets, the effect of increasing war risk on financial markets is 
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positive during main conflicts.  
During the war effect 
The period during the war has a wide-reaching impact on the public's perception 
of everything from their leaders to the financial markets. While studies on pre-war effect 
show that war affects financial markets, there seems to be no consensus among the 
researchers on the type of impact- positive or negative- that the war has. Numerous 
studies have addressed the potential impact of an ongoing war.  Yet, the existing evidence 
on the effect on stock markets is often contradictory and the quality of empirical studies 
varies extensively. 
One of the first researchers who studied a large number of international conflicts 
after the World War II is Brune et al. (2012). They looked at a particular war with a 
prologue, the war in Iraq. The prologue is a period of tensions before the outburst of war 
(Brune et al., 2012, p. 3). The war in Iraq can be divided into two phases: the pre-phase 
with an increasing danger of the war to be interrupted by a peaceful settlement and the 
outbreak period where the war is already initiated. When creating the dataset, Brune et al. 
(2012) faced two major issues. First, they had a lot of difficulty determining which wars 
to include. Second, after selecting the wars to be included, they realized that the data was 
too small to be used for the amount of variables that they attempted to test 
econometrically (Brune et al., 2012, p. 10). While researchers such as Rigobon and Sack 
(2005) looked at the conflicts as a whole, the study by Brune et al. (2012) observed the 
conflicts as separate events. Therefore, they looked into the Vietnam War, the Gulf War 
and the war in Afghanistan individually to determine what effects they had on the U.S. 
financial market. 
Researchers used news to determine the likelihood that an ongoing conflict will 
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result in war since the period of war "prologue" is different than an officially declared 
war. This data, which is similar to Rigobon and Sack (2005), also has measurement 
issues. They tried to correct for them, however, by using estimators for the probability 
that the war will occur in Iraq.  When observing the effect of likelihood of war, the 
researchers studied only the war in Iraq because they had access to a number of 
independent estimates for the probability of a war. One of the estimators, "Saddameter" 
was already created and published by Wiliam Saletan on the website www.slate.com. 
Slate.com is an online web page about current affairs, politics, and culture magazine in 
the United States. The magazine is not a breaking news source, but rather a source of 
analysis and interpretation of the report in news media. The source is unreliable because 
of the credibility of this source could be questioned because it is known for entertaining 
and witty writing. The second estimator "Saddam Security" was obtained from the online 
exchange platform www.tradesports.com, which was created to track the dates that 
Sadam Hussein was still in power.  Apart from the estimators, another news proxy was 
obtained from the New York Times, and it gave a daily amount of articles that contained 
the words "war" and "Iraq" (Brune et al., 2012, p. 7). In this study, researchers used two 
indexes from the U.S. financial market, the S&P500 and the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average, to measure the estimators' impact on financial markets. The news proxies seem 
to be more accurate and reliable than "Saddameter" and "Sadam Security" estimators. 
Brune et al. (2012) created and measured the news proxy variable in the study and thus, 
the reader can have a better understanding of its nature. On the other hand, it is hard to 
understand the process of creation and measurement by which two other estimators were 
obtained as they were pulled from the two external sources, websites. It is very likely that 
the internet sources of estimators, created for entertainment and betting, are biased. Thus, 
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by using estimators built on different websites, Brune et al. (2012) lowered the potential 
statistical significance of their research. These variables represent a significant limitation 
to the study since they impact the interpretation and findings of this study.   
"The war puzzle" theory established by Brune et al. (2012) says that the relation 
between stock market prices and the probability of an international conflict is negative 
while war is still in the evolving phase. The relationship becomes positive once the war 
breaks out or the likelihood of war increases to 100% (Brune et al., 2012, p. 3). This 
means that the prices of stocks will decrease with an increase in the probability of war, 
and they will increase with the start of the war. This theory is significant at the 1% and 
5% level if we look at the news variable and the “Saddameter” (Brune et al., 2012, p. 3). 
The findings also showed that if the war began as a surprise, the stock prices would 
decrease. These results indicate that the reason for the decrease or increase in stock prices 
does not depend on the particular war but rather on the history of it, meaning whether the 
war was a surprise to the society or not (Brune et al., 2012, p. 20). To understand the 
theory of the "war puzzle," researchers have looked at each war separately and performed 
a structural break analysis to determine whether the outburst of war had an effect on the 
stock market and identify the possible changes in trends of the stock market exchange. A 
structural break represents a change in the stock prices' mean, variance and trends over 
time (Hansen, 2001, p. 117). The structural change happens when one of these statistical 
parameters change at some point in time during the sample period. In econometrics, 
systematic methods are used to identify structural breaks. 
First, the Vietnam War had no definite time frame in which it can be placed. 
Thus, the war was described to a great extent by different periods of tensions. The 
researchers discovered that the financial market experienced the largest shock on April 
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15, 1965, which marks the date the U.S. and South Vietnamese bombed the Viet Cong 
positions in the country. On this day, the Dow Jones Industrial Average index increased 
by 28.01 points and their results show the effect of war on this jump in stock prices is 
statistically significant at the 1% level (Brune et al., 2012, p. 13). One of the limitations 
while analyzing this war effect is that the researchers could not look at the pre-war period 
or the outbreak of the war, and thus it represents the deviation from the already 
established method of the "war puzzle" theory. 
Second, the Gulf War began when Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and 
ended on February 28, 1991, when the U.S. and its allies defeated Iraq (Brune et al., 
2012, p. 14). Brune et al. (2012) results from the time-series tests showed that the news 
on the Gulf War had a negative relationship with the stock market prices. While 
supporting the "war puzzle" theory, the findings were statistically insignificant.  The 
results could be limited by the fact that the war was observed from the perspective of 
U.S. and its allies (Brune et al., 2012, p. 14). The period of observation for the Gulf War 
was manipulated because it was shaped towards the researchers’ perspective and the 
United States war involvement. As they were observing it from the U.S. perspective, 
Brune et al. (2012) used the date of the Operation Desert Storm, January 17, 1991, as a 
start date for their analysis. By using a date before the actual one, the researchers might 
have manipulated the findings to support the "war puzzle" theory. Instead of being looked 
at as a period of the war, the period of August 1990 to January 1971 was observed as a 
prewar period.   
Finally, researchers also looked at the War in Afghanistan that began in October 
of 2001. This war had a short prelude that lasted only several months, starting on 
September 11, 2001. Even though the war was a surprise and the stock market prices 
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started to decrease as a consequence of the attacks, a structural break was noticed right 
before the outburst of war. The S&P 500 Index increased right around the war start 
(Brune et al., 2012, p. 17). The coefficient rose from 960 points on September 21, 2001, 
to 1100 on November 10, 2001. This increase in S&P 500 suggests that an unexpected 
shift has occurred in the time series data on stock prices. Structural breaks, if repeated, 
decrease the reliability of the model and increase the number of errors when forecasting. 
These structural breaks represent a limitation to the reliability of the "war puzzle" model 
and its ability to forecast without errors.  
Even though Brune et al. (2012) concentrated on the wars that witnessed longer 
periods of tensions, they also looked into three examples of "surprise wars." They found 
that wars such as Pearl Harbor, the Korean War and the Persian Gulf War caused the 
stock market prices to drop significantly at the outbreak of the war (Brune et al., 2012, p. 
19). This fall in market prices as a result of surprise wars is the complete opposite effect 
compared to wars with a prelude. The Dow Jones Industrial Average Index declined by 
3% in one day when Pearl Harbor happened, 5% in the case of Korean War and 5.7% in 
the case of Gulf War in a week (Brune et al., 2012, p. 20). Because of these results, the 
"surprise wars" pose a challenge to the classical asset pricing models.  The asset pricing 
model does not account for investors’ expectations, and thus the outburst of war raises 
the systematic risk which cannot be diversified away. The asset pricing model reflects 
only the information that is available to the general public. Thus, the surprise wars are 
accounted in the model only after they occur.  
As an attempt to explain this puzzling movement of the stock prices, Brune et al. 
(2012) established six explanations that provide some reasoning for this adverse effect. 
First, the researchers argue that the war is not a puzzle since it stimulates the economy. 
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While this explains the increase in stock market prices, it fails to account for the decrease 
in prices prior the war. Second, they pose an explanation that the time dimensions of the 
war, or the investors' expectations about a quick end of the war influence the flow of 
investment in the market. This explanation states the investors start buying stocks again 
after the outbreak of the war since they assume that the conflict would be over soon 
(Brune et al., 2012, p. 22). It does not explain why stock prices and the likelihood of war 
in negative relationship in the period before war. Investors' ambiguity aversion is also a 
possible explanation for the probability of war should lower the amount of investment. 
However, the ambiguity effect of the war probability stops once the war starts, and the 
uncertainty reduces (Brune et al., 2012, p. 23). Another explanation that Brune et al. 
(2012) proposed is the correlation between the uncertainty of the war and the uncertainty 
about choosing allocations for portfolios. A peaceful settlement and war would result in 
investors making different investment allocations (Brune et al., 2012, p. 23). Thus, in the 
period of high tensions, the optimal behavior would be if the investor would abstain from 
making an investment and reduce the amount of investment that they are placing in the 
stock market (Brune et al., 2012, p. 23). Brune et al. (2012) thus recommended that 
investors decrease their stock holdings substantially. Various assets would have a 
different pattern in different phases before the war starts (Brune et al., 2012, p. 26). For 
example, the stocks in the "peace portfolio" should be sold when the probability of war 
increases. The “peace portfolio consists of stocks in the industries that would react 
positively to a war peace agreement, such as the airline industry, tourism or travel 
industry. Positive reaction of an industry would mean an increase in the stock prices of 
the companies within these industries as a result of business increase. 
The last explanation of the phenomenon is the classical mean-variance-
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preferences. This method weighs the variance, which is volatility or risk, against the 
expected return on the market. It can help the investors decide how much risk they want 
to bear while making the investment. Brune et al. (2012) claimed that the paradox of war 
impact is correlated with the mean-variance preferences of the investors (Brune et al., 
2012, p. 3). "One could argue that people do not buy when it is unsure what is going to 
happen due to their variance aversion, even though the expected return might still be a 
little bit better than when the war finally started" (Brune et al., 2012, p. 25). The mean-
variance-preferences say that an absolute war is preferred over an uncertain situation with 
a high probability of a war (Brune et al., 2012, p. 21).  Thus, we see an increase in the 
stock market price when war is absolute and a decrease in the stock price when the war 
could not have been predicted.  The conclusion of the researchers is that the asset prices 
are extremely sensitive to the probability for the start of the war and that the mean-
variance-preferences might be the best explanation of the puzzling effect of the wars in 
financial markets (Brune et al., 2012, p. 23). While mean-variance- preferences can 
explain part of the "war puzzle," there could be other explanations that are based on 
different behavioral factors. A new area of finance called behavioral finance, has been 
created to study the occurrence of anomalies in conventional finance and economics by 
adding behavioral and cognitive psychological theory to the traditional ideas. Anomalies 
in the financial market, such as war effect, violate the modern economic theories which 
assume that the investor will make their decisions based on rationale and logic. The 
conventional financial theory does not describe all situations that happen in the real world 
of financial markets. This does not mean that the standard theory has no value, but having 
behavioral finance in mind could explain how and why some occurrences in the financial 
markets happen. One of the factors that behavioral finance incorporates is “the behavior 
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of financial practitioners and the subsequent effect on markets” (Sewell, 2007, p. 1). 
Factors such as psychological characteristics of investors and information structure might 
have an influence on the stock market.  
In conclusion, Brune et al. (2012) saw a significant negative relationship between 
the likelihood of war and the movement of stock prices. War can be considered as a 
stimulus package for the U.S. economy and thus lead to an increase in stock market 
prices. Falling prices when war is looming and rising prices when war is starting: only the 
combination of these two observations makes the war puzzle a puzzle (Brune et al., 2012, 
p. 25). Using news analysis proxy for the estimated likelihood that a conflict will result in 
a war, they also discovered that "an increase in the war likelihood tends to decrease stock 
prices, but the significant outbreak of a war increased them” (Brune et al., 2012, p. 24). If 
the war starts as a surprise, the stock prices will experience a decrease. The researchers 
failed to explain this puzzling behavior of stock markets when the war starts by war risk, 
uncertainty aversion or by investors’ assumptions about a quick end of the war (Brune et 
al., 2012, p. 24). They argue that the most insight into this "war puzzle" can be provided 
by mean-variance analysis and behavioral finance. 
To determine the impact of war on the financial market, researchers use time 
series analysis in order to detect the structural breaks in the financial market. While the 
"war puzzle" model by Brune et al. (2012) was limited by structural breaks, Choudhry 
(2010) tried to incorporate these structural breaks or "turning points," as he calls them, 
into his analysis of the war’s impact on the markets (p. 1022). Choudhry (2010) described 
structural breaks as lasting shocks that happen on irregular intervals. Choudhry (2010) 
argued that “while some large shocks permanently shift the trend function of a series, the 
majority of the shocks have only temporary effect” (p. 1022). Thus, events during the war 
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can have both permanent and temporary effect on stock market. Choudhry (2010) utilized 
a fundamental shift oriented test that detected endogenously structural breaks and 
analyzed their effect on the U.S. stock market during World War II. The study was based 
on the observations from the daily DJIA stock index from January 1939 to December 
1945. The structural test identified specific events and periods that investors perceived as 
turning points. These turning points were different from the ones that historians identified 
because only selected political information is perceived as significant for financial 
markets. Thus, the structural shift test is used to measure and identify long-term structural 
changes in the structure of the economy, or specifically economic growth or economic 
development (Zeileis, 2005). Factors that cause such changes can be economic 
development factors, global shifts in labor and capital, changes in resource availability 
due to war, natural disaster, discovery or depletion of natural resources and changes in 
political system.  
Choudhry (2010) investigated the potential breaks or turning points in the DJIA 
daily index based on three different sizes of periods analyzed: one month, two months 
and three months. This data has been reported in quarterly periods.  For the next years 
observed, each time the entire period would be moved for one week since the first 
start/end dates. Using this data, Choudhry (2010) came to a conclusion that there are two 
types of breaks in stock prices. "Blips" are breaks that last only for a day or so, while 
"turning points" last much longer (Choudhry, 2010, p. 1037). While “blips” can be 
market reactions to false information, “turning points,” usually make a much more 
significant impact on the stock exchange that is unlikely to change soon.  Thus, consistent 
change in prices in the same direction could indicate a “turning point.” The most 
significant difference between the "blips" and the "turning points" is that "blips" are 
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measured by the one day change in the prices while the "turning point" is measured as the 
sum of the changes in the price over the next five working days after the event. Thus, to 
capture this long run effect caused by battles and conflicts during WWII, the change in 
price over five working days was observed.  
Choudhry (2010) showed that "turning points" were more significant to investors 
than "blips." He argues that investors view the majority of the events that were 
considered influential by historians "turning points" in financial markets. Various conflict 
developments (such as Pearl Harbor, the fall of Warsaw and the battle of Midway) are 
considered to be these "turning points."  On the other hand, some events were only seen 
as "blips" such as the initial invasion of Poland by Germany (Choudhry, 2010, p. 1037). 
Because of long duration and high intensity, investors failed to identify some important 
dates as either "blips" or "turning points." Investor's inability to detect these may be due 
to several reasons. The investors might have expected some events. Secondly, the 
identification process could have been subjective since the investors did identify the 
turning points and not the general public. Finally, some of these events (such as Battle of 
Britain and Operation Market Garden) might not have been important enough to U.S. 
investors since U.S. military was not fighting against them.  
Choudhry's (2010) argument is that events which change the probabilities of 
various outcomes, such as decisive battles, will be recorded in stock prices. After 
adjusting for serial correlation, he finds out that the U.S. financial market was heavily 
influenced by the events outside the U.S. during World War II. Choudhry (2010) argued 
that the war can affect the equity markets in two ways. First, war events can influence 
stock market by both increasing and decreasing equity prices. Good news from the 
battlefield usually implied the war would end soon, and thus the prices in the stock 
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exchange experienced a rise. Apart from this, Choudhry (2010) showed that any news 
that may indicate prolonging of the war resulted in a drop in the prices the day after the 
event and for the next five working days. Victories on the "Allies" side, the side that the 
U.S. was fighting on, influenced the stock market prices in a positive way in both one and 
five-day periods. Secondly, the investors can become more uncertain about the future 
profitability of equities and their risk (Choudhry, 2010, p. 1026). Lags in data from 
financial markets are an important issue here. There might be an issue with recognizing 
the lags, which represent the time between the period of actual economic shock and the 
period when the shock is recognized by investors. Days, weeks or months can pass 
studying data metrics, such as parameters of financial market performance, before the 
information gets collected and published to the public and investors.  Thus, this 
information on war from the past should be used to predict future returns from stock 
markets.  Apart from this, Choudhry (2010) looked at movement in the stock exchange 
before the U.S. officially joined or declared the war (p. 1031). The events that occurred 
before the U.S. involvement in the World War II were not perceived as important to the 
U.S. financial stock market by investors. These events are neither “turning points” nor 
“blips” to the stock market because the U.S. did not invest any resources or suffer any 
direct consequences. The last finding was that an escalation of the conflict did not lead to 
a rally in the stock market, unless the United States and Allies won or lost the battle 
(Choudhry, 2010, p. 1031). Because the victory is perceived as positive news by the 
investors, the stock market experiences a period of sustained increases in the equity 
prices. The length and magnitude of this rally would depend on the buying and selling 
behavior of investors after the information about victory is received. On the other hand, 
the investors viewed the defeat of the U.S. and Allies army as bad news which decreased 
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the stock prices. Another result is that financial markets had the biggest reactions to the 
events that started as a surprise and were economically relevant. The magnitude of the 
change in stock prices depends on the degree of the war surprise. The market reacts the 
most to surprise and economically relevant events because they have a great impact on 
investors’ expectations about equity returns. Investors, who fail to use all the relevant 
information, even regarding the news from the battlefield, will face losses.  
Some of the results were statistically insignificant because of two factors: long 
duration and high severity of some of these battles (Choudhry, 2010, p. 1030). There 
might be an issue of isolating the data and its impact that occurs over a long period of 
time. Thus, events such as battle of Kursk, battle of Coral Sea, battle of Normandy and 
battle of Guadalcanal were not identified as structural breaks or “turning points.”  
As political events, such as armed conflict or war, develop, market agents will 
adjust their position depending on the expected result of the conflict as this is determined 
by various incidents during the military operations that can affect the course and the 
outcome of the fighting. Schneider and Troeger (2006) looked at wartime events as 
exogenous developments that can become relevant for the financial markets. The 
researchers investigated the reactions of the DJIA, Financial Times Stock Exchange 
(FTSE) index and Cotation Assistée en Continu (CAC) index on the intensity of three 
conflicts in the period 1990-2000 (Schneider & Troeger, 2006, p. 623). In order to 
analyze the effect of war, they use a rational expectation framework within commercial 
liberalism. By using this framework, researchers were able to establish a rational 
expectations argument that explains the relation of political events to the world economy. 
This refined version of commercial liberalism allowed the researchers to test for the 
degree to which the three indices reflected international news during a ten year period 
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(Schneider & Troeger, 2006, p. 624).  By using this method, researchers show that 
conflicts have an adverse effect on the interactions inside the three financial markets, 
French, U.S. and British. "This article introduced a refined version of commercial 
liberalism to show that international markets react negatively rather than positively to war 
but that "war rallies" at stock markets can also be occasionally observed" (Schneider & 
Troeger, 2006, p. 642). Similar to Brune et al. (2012), Schneider and Troeger (2006) 
discovered the puzzling impact of war. They have found that even though events during 
wartime should lead to adverse reactions, an escalation of the conflict may still lead to a 
rally in the stock market.  
Hostilities usually lead to a reduction of uncertainty and an increase in the price of 
stocks in the market. The researchers define hostilities as the severity of the conflictive 
events during war. They found that as war in Iraq developed, the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average index was rising as investors perceived the intensification of a conflict as a sign 
of Western resolve. On the other hand, conflicts in Israel/Palestine and Ex-Yugoslavia 
had a negative impact on the US stock market. "While it is reasonable to anticipate 
negative effects of the average conflictive act, markets might respond positively to 
certain violent episodes within a war because they signal that the worst is over or that the 
damage might not be as great as originally expected" (Schneider & Troeger, 2006, p. 
624). In order to demonstrate this positive reaction of stock markets to fierce battles 
during war, Schneider and Troeger (2006) gave an example of the conflict between the 
alliance led by U.S. and the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. While the Dow Jones Index 
decreased by 6.31 percent following the intrusion of Kuwait by Iraqi military troops in 
1990, it increased 17 percent in the initial four weeks of operation called "Desert Storm" 
(Schneider & Troeger, 2006, p. 625). This contradictory reaction of the markets can be 
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attributed to the escalation period of the armed conflict. This "war rally" in the U.S. stock 
market was interrupted by an increase in volatility of the index because the U.S. military 
encountered resistance.  
A common method used by researchers is to collect cross country data, where war 
or conflict is expressed with a dummy variable and evaluate the effect of it over time on 
other variables such as investment rates or economic growth. This method is criticized 
because it is difficult to identify a causative relationship between the existence of conflict 
and the variable of interest. Guidolin and La Ferrara (2005) addressed the problem in an 
easier way with the purpose to isolate the analysis of the war impact on the financial 
markets. In order to do so, they look at the problem endogenously by observing the 
relationship of violent conflict and asset market reactions that are led by investor's 
perceptions.  They use the event study methodology to observe not only the stock market, 
but also market with currencies, futures contracts and standardized commodities 
(Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2005, p. 2). They also considered a sectoral stock market index 
which might be of extreme interest for the future, a defense equity index for the US. They 
obtained weekly data on the Dow Jones' Aerospace & Defense MicroSector Index, which 
is a continuously rebalanced fund containing five blue chip stocks registered on the New 
York Stock Exchange. Companies that were included at the moment of their research 
were: Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed, Northrop, and Raytheon (Guidolin and La 
Ferrara, 2005, p. 10). 
Guidolin and La Ferrara (2005) observed the effect that 112 conflicts and civil 
wars had on national stock, foreign and world market indices in the period from 1974 to 
2004. They distinguished between the civil wars and international conflicts, as well as 
international and domestic markets. Findings showed that most of the conflicts observed 
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impacted the stock indices and stock commodity prices significantly. "When we 
disaggregate between internal and international conflicts the US index is the one that 
yields on average the highest proportion of significant results: 7.5% of internal conflicts 
have a negative impact, and 10.4% have a positive one, while for international conflicts 
there figures are 8.3% and 16.7%, respectively" (Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2005, p. 15). 
The U.S. market also reacts more positively to the start of war than negatively. Apart 
from this, the national stock market is more likely to display positive reactions to war 
news compared to other world markets. When comparing the results on U.S., UK and 
French stock markets, researchers found that international conflicts affect U.S. markets 
more often that UK and French ones. A reason for this can be that the speculative activity 
is greater in most efficient financial centers such as The New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations 
(NASDAQ). In these centers the risk of loss is more than offset by the possibility of huge 
gain. Apart from this, the finding that U.S. markets appear to be more reactive suggests 
that domestic markets experience war-induced rallies in which investors tend to buy and 
the beginning of conflict is seen as an indication of resolve. Location of the war matters 
as well. The impact of international conflicts is more significant than domestic, regardless 
of whether the impact was positive or negative. 
Polarization is another factor that affects the stock market. Political polarization 
refers to the situations where individual's view on different issues, policies or people is 
likely to be shaped by their identification with a particular political party or ideology.   
Researchers refer to a country as “highly polarized” if the Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 
(2005) ethnic polarization index is more than or equal to the sample median polarization 
level.  Countries that have “low polarization” have a polarization index that is smaller 
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than the sample median (Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2005, p. 18). “If we consider that 
highly polarized societies are societies where the opponent groups is relatively more 
balanced (with the highest polarization occurring when society is split into two equally 
sized groups), then we obtain the prediction that conflict should last longer in more 
polarized settings (Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2005, p. 7). The study done by Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol (2005) shows that the median duration of civil war doubles as the ethnic 
polarization index raises from zero to one (Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2005, p. 7). These 
findings show that polarization influences investors' expectations about the duration and 
intensity of the war. Thus investors tend to react more in the polarized settings. In “highly 
polarized” countries, polarization would amplify the impact of war in the stock market. 
This indicates that the social structure of the countries and regions where the conflicts 
occur is important to markets and investors when creating expectations on the intensity 
and duration of the war (Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2005, p. 3). "Eighteen percent of the 
international conflicts taking place in highly polarized countries have a negative effect on 
the World stock market index that we consider, while none of those taking place in 
countries with low polarization do" (Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2005, p. 3).  The study 
done by Guidolin and La Ferrara shows that expectations about length and intensity of 
war further affect the stock markets. These findings should be taken with reserve since 
Guidolin and La Ferrara (2005) argued that polarization can enlarge the results. 
Polarization of the country magnifies the magnitude of the war’s impact on the economy 
inside the state (Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2005, p. 18). Researchers argue that 
polarization in society and politics go together with polarization in economics. 
Polarization of the economy indicates that there is great gap between low-class and high-
class jobs in terms of wages and abilities of the workers. Differences in wages and skills 
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influence the social structure of the region. Social structure of the region and political 
information manipulates investor’s expectations on the intensity and duration of wars in 
the case where investors learn from biased or inaccurate political information. Thus, the 
magnification is more severe at the beginning of the conflict as political information on 
polarization and social structure can be enlarged and distorted. This might be a reason 
why findings on wars in polarized countries are more significant than results in less 
polarized regions.   
To sum up, as the war develops and moves from one stage to another, the impact 
of war on stock market changes as well. In the evolving phase, war has a negative impact 
on equity prices. Wars that began as a surprise had a negative impact on prices as well, 
while expected wars, or wars with prelude, increased stock prices. During the war, 
conflicts perceived as “turning points” had much larger impact on stock markets by 
causing both surge in prices and drop in prices depending on whether the United States 
was winning or losing. “Blips,” or one-day shocks had less severe impact on the stock 
market. Escalation in conflict may lead to rally in the U.S. equity market. The domestic 
stock market experiences more positive reactions to ongoing international conflicts than 
negative ones. Polarization and duration of war impact the magnitude and the direction of 
impact (positive or negative).  
Post-war effect  
Overall the post-war period appeared to exhibit less price fluctuation (Gordon, 
1986, p. 659). Thus, the post-war era is stronger and more stable than the prewar period. 
Feldstein et al argue that "the economy's downturns have been both shorter and 
shallower" (Feldstein et al., 1980, p. 12). The economic recessions are less frequent in 
this period and the recessions that follow war are usually less severe than the recessions 
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before or during the war. This can be seen from the example that no severe recessions 
happened for decades after 1953-1954 and 1957-1958 recessions. In the period after the 
war, equity prices are less variable (Feldstein et al., 1980, p. 13). All of these indicate that 
the country enters a period of economic stability and prosperity. 
Once the public and investors realize that the post-war period started, they change 
their thinking that was originally present during the war. They observe government’s 
implementation of important economic policies after the end of the war. Postwar policies 
that focus on economic growth and stability have the biggest influence on financial 
markets. These procedures may include shifts in favor of federal versus state 
administrative powers, more bank consolidations and more branch banking. "Change 
may be orderly or disorderly, but change must come" (Chandler, 1967, p. 12). The hope 
is that future policies will place less emphasis on restrictiveness and more on the 
promotion of competition in financial markets (Chandler, 1967, p. 12). 
In order to compare the effect of war in the postwar period, it is necessary to 
study what financial markets say about consequences of war.  Leigh, Wolfers and 
Zitzewitz (2003) argued that financial markets have reported new information, assessed 
risks and aggregated public and expert opinion better than economic activity. Unlike the 
analysis methods used in the prewar and during the war periods, Leigh et al. (2003) used 
a different method of analysis called the prospective approach.  "The prospective analysis 
system allows analysts to create models representing future situations of concern, drive 
and sustain them with evidence contained in current data and make reasoned estimates 
about the future" (Turner, Hetzler, Cheney, Williams, & Zabriskie, 2003, p. 1). The 
reason why Leigh et al. (2003) used this method of analysis is because they argue that 
financial markets do not only evaluate the present cost of war, but also take into 
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consideration the number and intensity of future conflicts (Leigh et al., 2003, p. 2). The 
scholars used “a financial instrument called "Saddam Security," which is an asset whose 
payoffs were correlated with the ousting of Saddam Hussein” (Leigh et al., 2003, p. 1).  
The future effect of war on oil prices was measured by this study by comparing 
movements in the  paper has "Saddam Security" instrument to the volatility in the price 
of oil futures (Leigh et al., 2003, p. 1). Their results showed that the U.S. financial 
markets are very sensitive to the probability of war. The ten percent rise in the probability 
of expelling Saddam from the leadership position decreased the S&P 500 by 1.5 percent 
(Leigh et al., 2003, p. 1). This indicates that the U.S. equity prices decreases by 15% in 
case of war. “The increase in (non-diversifiable) risk associated with war should also 
increase the cost of equity; equity valuations are of course sensitive to even small 
changes in the cost of equity” (Leigh et al., 2003, p. 18).  
Leigh et al. (2003) investigated and analyzed three issues in their paper. First they 
use financial market data to better understand the consequences of a U.S. policy decision 
in real time, such as the invasion of Iraq. Second, their paper questions the extent to 
which stock market movements can be explained by the news. Unlike Cutler, Poterba and 
Summers (1989), who argue that the media reports can explain only a small part of the 
market movement, this paper claims that econometrically, changes in probability of war 
can justify 30 percent of the variation in the S&P 500 and 75 percent fluctuation in spot 
prices of oil over the last five months (Leigh et al., 2003, p. 2). And lastly, their paper 
highlights the expected value to investors of political securities in improving the 
efficiency of markets. Political securities explain uncertainty about war and its impact on 
aggregating information about the likelihood of war in a publicly observed market price. 
The political uncertainty contributes to the uncertainty about asset values, and thus the 
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study suggests that investors should revise their beliefs about the utility of political risk 
securities (Leigh et al., 2003, p. 2). This suggests that the other non-war components can 
explain uncertainty in the stock prices.  
The biggest financial consequences of the Iraq war on the United States were the 
increase in the direct military expenditure, the cost of rebuilding Iraq in the post-war 
period, and macroeconomic repercussions caused by changes in oil prices (Leigh et al., 
2003, p. 3). The direct cost of going to war with Iraq for the U.S. has been estimated to be 
somewhere from $22- $140 billion. The U.S. would also have additional cost through 
peacekeeping, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance over the decade 2003-2012 at 
somewhere between $106-615 billion (Leigh et al., 2003, p. 5). This indicates the postwar 
rise of private debt economy. This increases the liabilities held in the market. 
  To find more about the cost of war Leigh et al. (2003) investigated its effect on 
oil markets and company values. War had the largest negative effects on the sectors of 
consumer discretionary and business equipment (Leigh et al., 2003, p. 36). On the other 
hand, "oil futures suggest that any adverse effect of war on oil prices will be short-term 
and that the NPV (net present value) of the long-run terms of trade shock is zero or 
slightly beneficial for a net oil importer, like the U.S." (Leigh et al., 2003, p. 35). Leigh et 
al., (2003) argued that in the short-run the oil prices per barrel would rise $1 for every ten 
percent increase in the likelihood of war with Iraq. Thus, if the risk of war rose to 100 
percent, meaning if the war started, the prices of oil would increase by $10 per barrel. In 
the long run oil prices may fall. 
Leigh et al. (2003) analysis is incomplete since it does not take into consideration 
the effect that the military intervention might have on the population and economy of 
Iraq. Because consequences inside Iraq would have direct effect on oil prices, the Dow 
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Jones Industrial Index would also be influenced by these internal developments in Iraq. 
Export oriented infrastructure and strategies in Iraq will also affect the economy of 
United States, and thus diplomacy and training of Iraqi oil industry leaders would help 
the domestic economy. Apart from this, substantial volatility in the market might be due 
to other factors than the likelihood of war. The prices may also move according to the 
new foreign policy that President Bush was making effective for future conflicts. Bush 
declared war on every political community or individual that supported terrorist groups. 
The new foreign policy, also referred to as the “Bush Doctrine,” advocated for an 
increase in unilateral military actions by the United States, increase in attacks on 
countries that harbor terrorists, use of pre-emptive wars in anticipation of imminent 
offense or invasion and implementation of democratic regime in government systems 
around the world as a strategy against terrorism.  
To conclude, economic recessions, post war policies and cost of war influences 
financial markets in the post-war period. War had negative effects on specific sectors in 
the market (consumer discretionary and business equipment) as well as oil prices. 
Political securities could be used to predict the uncertainty of equity prices after war 
ends. 
The literature concludes that in the pre-war period, information from history and 
news seems to control the direction and magnitude of the war’s effect on stock prices. 
The anticipation of a future war depresses stock prices. An increase in the probability of 
war will decrease stock prices while the outburst of war will impact the returns positively 
(Brune et al., 2012, p. 3). The only instance where the increase in war risk has a positive 
effect on stock markets is during major wars such as World War I and World War II 
(Ferguson, 2008, p. 468).  There is no general conclusion about the effects of wars of 
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different scales and nature. Instead, specific war characteristics such as regulatory 
regimes or developments in military and technology should be accounted for when 
extracting lessons from history (Ferguson, 2008, p. 436). Apart from this, war with 
prologue has a positive impact on stock prices while surprise wars and terrorist attacks 
magnify a decrease in financial returns (Brune et al., 2012, p. 3). 
During a war, “turning points,” or war events relevant to investors, had a much 
larger impact on stock markets by causing an escalation of prices when the United States 
was winning the conflict. On the other side, when the United States was losing an 
important battle, stock market prices decreased (Chourdy, 2011).  “Blips,” or one-day 
war shocks, had less of a severe impact on the stock exchange. Apart from these adverse 
effects, intensification of conflict may lead to a rally in the U.S. equity market (Schneider 
& Troeger, 2006, p. 642). The destination and social structure of countries where the U.S. 
is fighting war matters (Guidolin & La Ferrara, 2005). When it comes to international 
conflicts, the U.S. stock market has more positive reactions than negative ones. 
Polarization and the duration of war impact the magnitude and the direction of effect 
(positive or negative) on domestic financial market performance (Guidolin & La Ferrara, 
2005). 
After the war has ended, the financial stock market experiences major fluctuations 
in stock market returns. The reasons for this may be economic recessions, postwar 
policies and the costs of war influences financial markets in the post-war period 
(Chandler, 1967). War had negative effects on specific sectors in the market (consumer 
discretionary and business equipment) as well as oil prices. Political securities could be 
used to predict the uncertainty of equity prices after the war ends (Leigh et al., 2003, p. 
2). 
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Chapter 4: Testing the Hypothesis 
There is a divide in literature as to whether war and movements in Dow Jones 
Industrial Average index are negatively or positively related, with the reasons 
stemming from differing empirical approaches, different datasets over different 
periods, and the use of various explanatory variables. This chapter seeks to add value 
to the literature by using updated data collected in 2015. Additionally, different 
variables are used to attempt to improve past models and include relevant variables 
that describe the movement in the stock market.  
The hypothesis that the U.S. involvement in a war, whether it is 
congressionally authorized or a unilateral act by the president, will cause a positive 
change in returns from Dow Jones Industrial Average index will be tested 
econometrically using regression analysis. Independent variables gathered are 
financial indicators and parameters that affect the condition of stock markets, found in 
studies such as Mehl (2013), Koubi (2005) and Schneider and Troeger (2006). Several 
new explanatory variables, which were omitted from the literature, are included, and 
their importance is highlighted. The dependent variable observed is the percent change 
in returns from the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index.  In this paper, the findings 
show that short wars have a highly positive impact on the quarterly returns from 
financial markets. The results indicate that a decrease or increase in index prices does 
not depend on the particular war but rather on the history prior it, meaning whether the 
war was a surprise to the investors or not. The rest of the chapter is set up in the 
following manner; the first section includes a description of the data and their effect 
on the stock market and Section II describes the econometric model employed in this 
study. Section III shows empirical results and comments on the statistical and 
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economic significance of the estimators. The last section of the chapter is the 
discussion and conclusion.  
Data  
The dataset was collected from 220 quarters on the movement in the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average index price, starting from October 1949. Three subsequent months in 
a year represent quarters that end in March, June, September, and December. The 
variables that were chosen were based on previous research done by as Mehl (2013), 
Koubi (2005), Brune et al. (2012) and intuition. Initially collected data was reduced 
several times to obtain the final version used for the purpose of this study and analysis. 
The money supply variable was removed because of the high multicollinearity with the 
Exchange Rate and Federal Debt.  Because many observations were omitted before 1960 
eleven years of observation had to be dropped from the initial dataset.  
The data gathering was concentrated in the years after October 1960. The result is 
a dataset of 220 quarterly movements on the Dow Jones Industrial Average index price 
during different wars. As discussed in the previous section, wars led by the United States 
can be divided into two categories based on war powers: unilateral acts by a President 
and congressionally authorized wars. Time periods for these wars is listed in Table 1, 
Table 2 and Table 3. There are eighteen periods of war and conflicts that were observed 
and each of them varied in nature, duration and scale.  
Limitations are placed on the extent of the analysis due to the relatively restricted 
period and the amount of information on recent wars. Figure 8, depicts the movement, 
and behavior of the Dow Jones Industrial Average index returns over time and different 
wars. The time trend observed is from 1960 until 2015, where 1 stands for the first 
quarter in 1960 and 220 for the third quarter in 2015. 
77 
 
 
Figure 8. Historical Dow Jones Industrial Average returns (%∆) 1960-2015 
 
Source: Data used in this study. 
It is important to note that the variable of interest is the quarterly percent change 
in the Dow Jones Industrial Average stock price index. The quarterly return from DJIA 
stock price index represents a measurement of the war's impact on the return from U.S. 
stock market. The DJIA index return was expressed in quarterly percent change to avoid 
issues of heteroscedasticity that is common in time series data. Apart from this, DJIA 
stock market index has been selected over others, such as Standard & Poor's 500 (S&P 
500), because of its long existence, and reputation of the most-cited market indicator in 
different academic and educational sources (such as publications, newspapers, the 
internet).  "The DJIA today serves the purpose to provide a clear, straightforward view of 
the stock market and by extension, the U.S. economy" (McGraw Hill Financial- Dow 
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Jones Averages, 2015).  The Dow Jones Industrial Index is often called Dow 30 since it 
contains 30 different component companies that are coming from manufacturers that 
produce industrial and consumer goods (McGraw Hill Financial - Dow Jones Averages, 
2015). Other businesses included are from various sectors such as financial services, 
information and communications technology and entertainment. Table 2 lists the different 
enterprises that were components of Dow Jones Industrial Average at the time when the 
data was collected. The table also lists companies that were components of DJIA index in 
June 1959. Since Charles Dow created the DJIA index in 1896, there were nearly 50 
changes to its elements because the index followed the variations in the economy itself. 
While DJIA index consisted of 30 components back in 1960, they were significantly 
different from the companies in the index today.  
Because the Dow Jones Industrial Average index contains stocks that are 
frequently traded and widely held by institutional and individual investors, the 
fundamental characteristic of this market indicator is timeliness. Timeliness makes the 
trading price of the Dow Jones reflect the most recent transactions conducted at any time 
during the day when the stock market exchange is open. It also accounts for all the 
necessary changes in the stock prices of element companies. The data on the adjusted 
close price of the Dow Jones Industrial Average index was collected from its source, 
S&P Dow Jones Indices database, which is in large part owned by McGraw Hill 
Financial. 
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Table 2: Components of Dow Jones Industrial Average Index (September 2015 
and June 1959) 
September 2015 June 1959 
Ticker Company Name  
MMM 3M Co. Allied Chemical 
AXP American Express Co. Aluminum Company of America 
AAPL Apple Inc. American Can 
BA Boeing Co. American Tel. & Tel. 
CAT Caterpillar Inc. American Tobacco B 
CVX Chevron Anaconda Copper 
CSCO Cisco Systems Inc. Bethlehem Steel 
KO Coca-Cola Co. Chrysler 
DD E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. Du Pont 
XOM Exxon Mobil Eastman Kodak Co. 
GE General Electric Co. General Electric Co. 
GS Goldman Sachs Group Inc General Foods 
HD Home Depot Inc. General Motors Co. 
INTC Intel Corp. Goodyear 
IBM International Business Machines Corp. International Harvester 
JPM JPMorgan Chase International Nickel 
JNJ Johnson & Johnson International Paper Co. 
MCD McDonald's Corp. Johns-Manville 
MRK Merck & Co. Inc. Owens-Illinois Glass 
MSFT Microsoft Corp. Procter & Gamble Co. 
NKE NIKE Inc Sears Roebuck & Co. 
PFE Pfizer Inc. Standard Oil of California 
PG Procter & Gamble Co. Standard Oil (N.J.) 
TRV Travelers Cos. Swift & Co.  
UTX United Technologies Corp. Texaco Incorporated  
UNH UnitedHealth Group Inc. Union Carbide 
VZ Verizon Communications United Aircraft 
V Visa Inc U.S. Steel 
WMT Wal-Mart Stores Inc. Westinghouse Electric 
DIS Walt Disney Co. Woolworth 
Source: McGraw Hill Financial- Dow Jones Averages,2015 
Statement as of 12/10/2015 
 
 
The main independent variable used to represent war contains wars that are 
congressionally authorized and uses of force by the President. Because there was no 
document officially published by the government that gives a complete overview of wars 
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which were led by the United States or wars in which the United States was involved in, 
Fishers (2004) book Presidential War Powers was used as a source of the war data. As it 
can be seen from Table 3, the start and end dates of these wars were used to create this 
predictor variable over the period observed. U.S. involvement in the war is represented 
by a dummy variable. Even though the exact start and end dates are not reflected 
accurately in the quarterly data, a value of one was given to the quarter that was, at least, 
one day into the war in which the U.S. was involved. Zero signifies any quarter where 
there was no war, or any quarter when the U.S. was in peace with other countries.  
Between 1960 and 2015, there were only five congressionally authorized wars. Thirteen 
other conflicts were a result of uses of force by the President. 
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Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the regression 
analysis. Model I observed the impact of ten different variables on Dow Jones Industrial 
Average index, such as Consumer Confidence Index, beginning of war, war duration, 
exchange rate (GBP/USD), interest rate, unemployment rate, inflation rate, real debt, real 
GDP and real federal deficit.  
To analyze the impact of U.S. war on the stock market returns in Model I, two 
additional war variables were created from a variable on periods of United States 
involvement in the war. War duration indicates the length, or the number of quarters, of 
Table 3:  United States Involvement in War (1960-2015) 
War War Start Date War End Date 
Vietnam War/ Gulf of Tonkin August 7, 1964 April 30, 1975 
Mayaguez Affair May 12, 1975 May 15, 1975 
Operation Eagle Claw/ Iran April 24, 1980 April 25, 1980 
Conflict in Lebanon/ Beirut* September 29, 
1982 
February 26, 1984 
Conflict in Grenada October 25, 1983 December 15, 1983 
Conflict in Libya March 24, 1986 April 18, 1986 
Persian Gulf Escorts/ Operation Earnest 
Will 
May 17, 1987 September 26, 1988 
Panama/ Operation Just Cause December 20, 1989 January 31, 1990 
Persian Gulf War I/ Operation Desert 
Shield/Operation Desert Storm 
August 2, 1990 February 28, 1991 
Missile Attacks on Baghdad June 26, 1993 June 26, 1993 
Combat Operations in Somalia/ Operation 
Gothic Serpent 
August 8 1993 March 24, 1994 
Haiti/Operation Uphold Democracy September 19, 
1994 
March 31, 1995 
Bosnia and Herzegovina/Operation 
Deliberate Force 
August 30, 1995 September 20, 1995 
Iraq missile attacks/ Operation Desert Fox December 16, 1998 December 19, 1998 
Sudan and Afghanistan missile 
attacks/Operation Infinite Reach 
August 20, 1998 August 20, 1998 
Conflicts in Yugoslavia/ Serbia March 24, 1999 June 11, 1999 
Afghanistan/Operation Enduring Freedom October 7, 2001 Present 
Persian Gulf War II/Iraq/Operation 
Enduring Freedom 
March 20, 2003 May 1, 2003 
Source: Fisher, Louis (2004). Presidential War Powers. Lawrence, Kansas: 
University of Kansas Press.  
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each war that U.S. was involved in. It investigates whether the duration of war has any 
impact on financial markets. One stands for the first quarter of war, two for the second 
quarter and so on. Previous research suggests that war duration has a positive impact on 
economic growth (Koubi, 2005). Duration, however, is expected to have adverse effects 
on the stock market. To account for the timing of the war and analyze whether the start of 
the war had an effect on the stock market returns, a measure for the beginning of the war 
was employed in the first model. Brune et al. (2012), suggest that the start of war will 
impact the stock prices positively because the investor the uncertainty about the future 
events is decreased. One indicates the first quarter of each war and zero stands for all 
other quarters.  
The percentage change in Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) is used as the 
indicator that measures consumer confidence. Consumer confidence represents the level 
of optimism about the state of the economy which is enunciated by consumers' activities 
in savings and spending Collins and Shinko, 2009, p. 1).  Each month 5,000 households 
are examined about their opinion on five different topics: current conditions in business, 
commercial enterprise circumstances in the following six months, current employment 
situation, the status of employment in the coming six months and cumulative family 
income for the subsequent six months (Collins and Shinko, 2009). In the U.S., the 
Conference Board, which is an independent organization for research in economics, 
conducts all of this research and issues the index. The benchmark for this confidence is 
the year 1985 where the index has a value of 100. The CCI index is important because 
investors use it in the process of determining periodic trends commodities, currencies and 
equities. Because it measures optimism about the state of the economy, higher CCI index 
indicates that the economy is in a stable condition. Thus, the predicted relationship 
83 
 
between CCI index and the stock market is positive. Monthly Consumer Confidence 
Index data was collected from the Organization for the Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) database.  
Data used for Model I contains four different economic indicators that are 
expressed in rates: exchange rate, interest rate, unemployment rate and inflation rate.  The 
exchange rate used in this study is the British Pound to the U.S. Dollar (GBP/USD). This 
currency pair indicates how many U.S. dollars need to be exchanged for one British 
Pound.  This currency pair was selected because it is one of the major, or most traded, 
currency pairs. Apart from this, GBP/USD exchange rate had the most historical data 
available. Because the U.S. dollar convertibility into gold was suspended in August 1971, 
the number of observations for this variable was significantly smaller if compared to 
other explanatory variables in the dataset. The exchange rate was included in the dataset 
because it affects the returns investors receive from the stocks of foreign companies or 
portfolios with foreign holdings. Investors often make attempts to hedge the risk arising 
from exchange rate movements. Data on exchange rates was obtained from the Federal 
Reserve database.  
Another economic indicator used included in this dataset is the prime loan interest 
rate. This prime lending rate is an interest rate used by banks and it represents the cost of 
borrowing money to the best customers. The data obtained from the Federal Reserve 
database included monthly "average majority prime rate charged by banks on short-term 
loans to business, quoted on an investment basis" (Federal Reserve, 2015). This interest 
rate is essential to stock market returns because it affects the discretionary income of 
consumers and consequently the performance of businesses as indicated by profits and 
revenues. In a more direct way, this interest rate represents the cost of borrowing and 
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affects the amount of dollars businesses can borrow from banks too. This will affect the 
stock valuation process, as higher prime loan interest rates would usually mean lower 
expected future cash flows of the company. Both of these interest rate effects will impact 
the valuation of a company's stock, as well as size and direction of the investment. Even 
the prime loan interest rate does not have a direct influence on the stock market, increases 
in interest rates should decrease the amount of investment in the stock exchange. When 
interest rates increase domestic investors prefer to invest in bonds rather than investing in 
equities because for they get less risk for the same money. The Federal Funds rate has a 
more significant effect on the stock market because it affects the stock valuation process 
in a more direct way than the prime loan rate. Because of high collinearity with another 
explanatory variable, the inflation rate, the bank prime loan rate was chosen instead of the 
Federal Funds Rate.  
The third economic indicator used in the first model is the level of unemployment. 
The civilian unemployment rate is defined as "the number of unemployed persons as a 
percentage of the total labor force" (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015). More people with 
jobs equate to higher income, potentially higher retail sales, savings, and corporate 
profits. Thus, stock prices rise or fall with low or high unemployment rate. The state of 
the economy is important to investors when making investment decisions. However, 
since most people do not know what a “good economy” means, people usually associate 
low levels of unemployment rate with a “good economy.” In contrast, a high 
unemployment rate is a signal of an “unhealthy economy” (Talubee, n.d.). Thus, the 
predicted impact of increasing unemployment levels is negative. The data on monthly 
unemployment rate was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics database. 
Finally, the inflation rate was another controlled variable used in this dataset. To 
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calculate the price movement of goods and services from 1960 until 2015 the Consumer 
Price Index for all Urban Consumers (CPI-U) was used as it is one of the most reported 
indexes. The inflation rate can also cause the stock market to rise or fall depend on the 
signals this indicator provides, investor’s ability to hedge and government’s 
implementation of monetary policy. The stock market experiences greater volatility 
during periods of high inflation levels. Nominal stock prices were expected to increase 
during the times of high inflation as investors used this as a hedge against inflation 
(Pearce, 1984). Thus, a positive effect on stock market returns is expected during periods 
of increasing inflation. Data on CPI-U was collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
Real debt, as a change in direct liabilities of the United States Government over 
time, is a significant factor in the U.S. financial market. Change in real debt refers to the 
change in the U.S. national public debt which consists of all government debt securities 
issued by the U.S. Treasury. As government spending and borrowing increase, investors 
become more concerned about the state of the economy (Hrung & Seligman, 2011). 
Thus, the greater real debt would decrease the stock prices. However, the effect of real 
debt on stock market returns is inconclusive. Data on federal debt was collected from the 
Federal Reserve database.  
The federal deficit is the amount by which the government's total budget outlays 
exceed its total receipts for a fiscal year. While the current deficit is factored in stock 
market prices, information and news on the deficit amount that is different from what is 
already known and expected will impact investment returns. Roley and Schal (1998) 
suggest that increase in the deficit impact the stock market by slightly increasing the 
stock market. Since deficits rise during recessions, the positive effect of a federal deficit 
on stock prices is caused by an increase in output from recession levels (Roley & Schal, 
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1998). On the other side, the “deficit hawk” argument states that government deficits 
cause higher inflation and higher interest rates (Northrup, 2003). The impact of a deficit 
on the stock market would then be inconclusive. Thus, the literature is divided on 
whether the federal deficit is a good indicator of stock market performance.  
Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is another indicator of an economy's 
wellbeing. Real GDP is adjusted for inflation, and it represents the total value of all final 
goods and services produced in a specific year within the country’s borders. It includes 
consumption by individuals and public, as well as outlays, net exports and investment by 
a government (Gans, King, Stonecash, & Mankiw, 2011, p. 448). Any significant change 
in real GDP should have a substantial effect on stock market returns. Since GDP is a 
measure of the country’s economic performance, a rise in the level of GDP would 
suggest better performance of companies. As a result, companies would increase their 
investment activity which would affect their earnings and stock valuation positively 
(Talubee, n. d.). Thus, higher real GDP levels will increase the expected returns from the 
stock market. Annual data on real debt, real GDP, and the real deficit were obtained from 
the Economic Report of the President, 2015.  
Apart from the exchange rate which has 179 observations, most of the variables 
that were used in the first model have 220 observations. There are some variables, such 
as Consumer Confidence Index and Real GDP that have a small amount of data missing. 
One or two observations of these variables were omitted because of the process of 
calculating percent change from the original dataset.  
Table 4 shows that the variation in the return on investment ranges from about 
roughly negative 26.4 percentage to about positive 18 percentage on a quarterly basis. 
The average change in gain from DJIA index is estimated to be about 1.7% for every 
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quarter. Since 1960, the United States was involved in war 60 % of the time. The longest 
war lasted 57 quarters. This corresponds to the period of United States war involvement 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. The British Pound to U.S. Dollar exchange rate indicates that 
one pound was worth $1.7 on average. This amount implies that U.S. exports to Great 
Britain were supposed to be greater than imports. Apart from this, exchange rate 
movements could have a significant impact on returns from foreign company stocks. The 
unemployment level was six percent on average during every quarter since 1960. This 
percentage indicates that from 1960 until 2015 unemployment rate was slightly higher 
than the natural rate of unemployment, which is five percent on average. The level of 
interest rates was seven percentage on average for every quarter since 1960. The lowest 
historical interest rate was about three percentage and highest about eleven percent for 
every quarter.  Real debt increased by about one percent on average every quarter since 
1960. This quarterly increase means that debt rose during a sustained period of time. 
Unlike federal debt, the deficit experienced a greater movement over time. The percent 
change in the deficit on a quarterly basis ranged from about negative 743 percentage to 
about positive 2519 percentage. The percentage change in deficit is great because it 
reflects major peaks and declines in quarterly federal deficit since 1960. On average, the 
quarterly percent change in federal deficit indicates that government spending exceeded 
business and individual spending by 12 percentage. 
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The second model measures the impact of six independent variables on the returns 
from the stock market. Variables that showed the most significant impact on the stock 
market returns in the first model were used in this model. Thus, the second model is an 
abridged version of the first model.  
The third model employs war characteristics by duration to study further the 
impact of the length of war on DJIA returns. The Short War variable represents the first 
six months of U.S. involvement in the war. Previous research shows that the stock 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of overall sample 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Dow Jones Industrial Average 
index (Percent Change) 
1.7480 6.4733 -26.3735 18.0872 
Year 1987.75 15.9166 1960 2015 
Month 7.5000 3.3618 3 12 
U.S. Involvement in War 0.6000 0.4910 0 1 
Consumer Confidence Index 
(Percent Change) 
0.0014 0.4868 -1.4844 1.6626 
Unilateral Acts by the President 0.0864 0.2815 0 1 
Congressionally Authorized Wars 0.5136 0.5009 0 1 
Beginning of War 0.0591 0.2363 0 1 
War Duration 11.6727 15.9746 0 57 
Short War (less than six months) 0.1045 0.3067 0  1 
Medium War (between seven 
months and two year of conflict) 
0.1273 0.3340 0 1 
Long War (more than 2 years of 
conflict) 
0.3682 0.4834 0 1 
Exchange Rate (GBP/USD) 1.7617 0.3072 1.1152 2.5974 
Interest Rate 7.3980 3.3194 3.25 20.3233 
Unemployment Rate 6.1076 1.5945 3.4 10.6667 
Inflation Rate 0.9572 0.8265 -2.8272 3.9508 
Real Debt (Percent Change) 0.9587 1.3388 -2.0244 5.6480 
Real GDP (Percent Change) 0.6595 0.9506 -3.4265 3.3710 
Real Deficit (Percent Change) 12.0051 184.8419 -742.7901 2519.312 
Sources: The Federal Reserve, 2015; OECD, 2015; Bureau of Labor Economics, 
2015; Economics Report of the President, 2015; Congressional Research Service, 
2015; The World Bank, 2015; Fisher, 2004. 
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markets react positively to quick and cost-effective wars (Brune et al., 2012). The impact 
of short wars is expected to be magnified (Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2005). Chourdy 
(2011) showed that prolonging of the war decreased the stock prices. Thus, the reaction 
of stock markets to wars that last between seven months and two years will be tested. 
Because Brune et al. (2012) argue that investors’ expectations about the war ending will 
have a positive impact on the stock market, the effect of long wars was tested to see 
whether wars that last longer than two years will have a similar effect.  These variables 
have multiple dimensions of importance as the effect of war on financial market 
performance is identified for different war phases. 
According to Table 4, ten percent of the time observed was attributed to wars that 
lasted less than six months. From this we can conclude that about 17% of the wars fought 
are considered short. On the other hand, 12% of the period observed the United States 
was fighting a war that lasted between seven months and two years. Twenty percent of 
the U.S. wars since 1960 were longer than six months and shorter than two years. Since 
1960, about 37% of the time, the U.S. was fighting a war that lasted more than two years.  
Thus, in the modern period more than half of the wartime, which is a period during which 
war was fought, the United States was involved in a protracted conflict.  
The fourth model was created to analyze the effect of unilateral acts by the 
President and congressionally authorized wars on the stock market.  To measure the 
effect of unilateral acts on the stock market, quarters in which presidents engaged in 
military operations at least one day unilaterally were observed. These wars are shorter 
and more cost-effective because of lower Congress support and limitations imposed by 
War Powers Resolution. Table 5 shows that presidents used force unilaterally for about 
eight percent of their wars. The conflict in Libya in 2011 was excluded from this analysis 
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because the period of U.S. involvement in Libya overlapped with the period during which 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were fought. 
 
Most of the major wars since 1960 had congressional authorizations. Because of 
the congressional authorization, these wars were usually longer than unilateral acts by the 
president. Congressionally authorized wars had less legal limitations on the use of 
resources. Thus, they are considered to bring greater costs to the United States. To 
investigate the effect that Congress authorizations of war had on the stock market five 
wars listed in Table 6 were observed. Even though there are less congressionally 
authorized wars than unilateral acts by the president, the United States was fighting wars 
authorized by Congress about 51% of its wartime. 
 
Table 5:  Unilateral Acts by the President (1960-2015) 
War War Start Date War End Date 
Mayaguez Affair May 12, 1975 May 15, 1975 
Operation Eagle Claw/ Iran April 24, 1980 April 25, 1980 
Conflict in Grenada October 25, 1983 December 15, 1983 
Conflict in Libya March 24, 1986 April 18, 1986 
Persian Gulf Escorts/Operation Earnest 
Will 
May 17, 1987 September 26, 1988 
Panama/ Operation Just Cause December 20, 1989 January 31, 1990 
Missile Attacks on Baghdad June 26, 1993 June 26, 1993 
Combat Operations in Somalia/ Operation 
Gothic Serpent 
August 8 1993 March 24, 1994 
Haiti/Operation Uphold Democracy September 19, 
1994 
March 31, 1995 
Bosnia and Herzegovina/Operation 
Deliberate Force 
August 30, 1995 September 20, 1995 
Iraq missile attacks/ Operation Desert Fox December 16, 1998 December 19, 1998 
Sudan and Afghanistan missile 
attacks/Operation Infinite Reach 
August 20, 1998 August 20, 1998 
Conflicts in Yugoslavia/ Serbia March 24, 1999 June 11, 1999 
Source: Fisher, Louis (2004). Presidential War Powers. Lawrence, Kansas: 
University of Kansas Press.  
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Identification Strategy 
To find the effect of war on the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index time series 
models are used. In these models, the estimated coefficients measure the relative change 
in DJIA (Yt) for a given relative change in the explanatory variables. The model I 
controls for the duration of war and beginning of war variables which are derived from 
the United States war dummy variable. The second model includes the most statistically 
significant variables from the first model. The third model looks deeper into the war 
duration variable to evaluate whether the duration of war has an impact on stock market 
returns. Model I: War length and beginning of war with other factors  
∆DowJonesIndustrialAveraget= β0 + β1DurationofWar t + β2BeginningofWar t + 
γXi + εt 
Model II: War and Economic Indicators 
∆DowJonesIndustrialAveraget= β0 + β1DurationofWart + β2BeginningofWar t + 
β3∆ConsumerConfidenceIndext + β4UnemploymentRatet + β5InflationRatet+ 
β6∆RealGDPt + εt 
 
Model III: War types by length 
∆DowJonesIndustrialAveraget= β0 + β1ExchangeRate t + 
β2∆ConsumerConfidenceIndext + β3∆RealGDPt + β3InflationRate t + β4ShortWar t + 
β5MediumWar t + β6LongWar t +εt 
Table 6:  Congressionally Authorized Wars (1960-2015) 
War War Start Date War End Date 
Vietnam War/ Gulf of Tonkin August 7, 1964 April 30, 1975 
Conflict in Lebanon/ Beirut* September 29, 
1982 
February 26, 1984 
Persian Gulf War I/ Operation Desert 
Shield/Operation Desert Storm 
August 2, 1990 February 28, 1991 
Afghanistan/Operation Enduring Freedom October 7, 2001 Present 
Persian Gulf War II/Iraq/Operation 
Enduring Freedom 
March 20, 2003 May 1, 2003 
Source: Fisher, Louis (2004). Presidential War Powers. Lawrence, Kansas: 
University of Kansas Press.  
92 
 
 
Model IV: War types according to war powers in United States 
∆DowJonesIndustrialAveraget= β0 + β1ExchangeRate t + 
β2∆ConsumerConfidenceIndext + β3∆RealGDPt + β3InflationRate t + 
β4UnilateralActsbyPresident t + β5CongressionallyApprovedWars t + εt 
 
where γXi are eight different explanatory variables and εt is error over time. 
This breakdown is modeled according to Brune et al. (2012) and Koubi (2005). It is a 
useful way to view the financial market reaction to war completely while keeping in mind 
other economic and non-economic factors that have an effect.  
Models were tested for heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity and, given the 
variables used, none was found. A Durbin-Watson test was used to estimate serial 
correlation. No presence of autocorrelation was detected at the 10% significance level. 
However, when testing for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH), it was 
found in all four models. First, third and fourth model have ARCH disturbance at the 
10% level for the third order lag. The second model has both ARCH disturbance at first 
and third order lags, both significant at 5 % level. The regression estimates thus have 
error terms that are specific in size and variance. ARCH disturbance is a common feature 
of the financial time series because they usually exhibit time-varying volatility clustering. 
This volatility clustering means that present error term is related to the size of the error 
term in the previous time period. Financial and monetary periods exhibit ARCH problem 
because they usually have unsteady error terms caused by periods of high volatility that 
are followed by times of relative calm. 
Empirical Results 
Table 7 shows the regression results for all four models. While most of the 
economic and money measurement variables are not significant in explaining the percent 
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change in stock market returns, four variables showed a major impact.  
During the first quarter of war, the war had a positive effect on the returns from 
DJIA. The stock market performance increased by 3.46 percentage points for the first 
quarter of the war. This regression result overlaps with Brune et al. (2012) findings that 
the start of war causes a positive reaction in stock markets. The reason for this positive 
reaction can be that the market is predicting expansion and improvement of the economy. 
Because wars stimulate the increases in GDP (Koubi, 2005), the investor perceives this as 
a signal that the economy is expanding. Companies in the technology sector are expected 
to have an increase in profits after the wars starts. Thus, investors increase the price 
estimation of these stocks.  Another factor that might have influenced this positive effect 
that war beginning had on the stock market, is a decrease in uncertainty. War is no longer 
seen as a threat by investors. Once the information and news on the start of war are 
available, the investors increase their investment activity. Table 7 shows that the 
beginning of the war has a statistically significant effect on the returns from DJIA index.  
Another factor that highly influences the return from the DJIA index is consumer 
confidence about the state of the economy. For every one percentage point increase in the 
degree of optimism in the Consumer Confidence Index, the return from the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average index increases by roughly 5.6 percentage points. This result 
estimation is significant at 1 percent level. Greater optimism about the economy increases 
consumers spending and savings. Apart from this, the companies expand their investment 
activity in research and development, or new production processes. Because increased 
investment leads to higher earnings, the value of stock increases. Investors are thus 
encouraged to raise their investment activity, which is reflected in the stock market 
performance. It is important to note that when testing for correlation, Consumer 
94 
 
Confidence Index and the Beginning of war variable were not highly correlated variables.  
There is no discernable relationship between stock market returns and economic 
indicators and money measurements. For example, between 1960 and 2015, the 
correlation of DJIA returns (as percent change) to the budget deficit is 0.0002%. This 
indicates a feeble relationship which is highly insignificant as well. Because the budget 
deficit and budget debt do not affect the financial stock markets unless there is a change 
in news and information, the two variables were dropped from the second model.  
Table 7 below shows that the only two variables significant in the second model 
were the beginning of war variable and Consumer Confidence Index, which confirms our 
results from the first model. The estimations of the magnitude of impact were almost the 
same as the estimations from the first model. 
In an attempt to further study the impact of war duration, the third model looked 
at the war by the amount of time it was fought. When controlling for the length of the 
war, short wars had a statistically significant impact on the quarterly change in DJIA 
index. For every war shorter than six months the return from DJIA index increases by 
3.48 percentage points. Investors’ expectations about cost-effective and a quick war, in 
which victory is more likely, could explain the positive impact on DJIA index returns. 
The idea of quick and profitable wars is supported by this finding. Unlike short wars, 
wars that last between seven months and two years have a negative effect on returns from 
the stock market. While the estimation is not statistically significant, it still gives an 
insight into the direction of the medium wars effect on the stock market. Long wars seem 
to have a small positive impact on the returns from DJIA. Apart from having the 
relatively weak relationship with the stock market performance, the estimations of long 
wars impact is highly insignificant. An explanation behind why no statistically significant 
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effect was found between these war duration variables might be the unit of reporting used 
in this study. Because quarterly data gives a more general estimate for wars impact, it 
was hard to identify “turning points” and “blips” during these wars (Chourdy, 2011). 
Thus, quarterly data may not be able to capture the real effect of a prolonged conflict.  
The effects of unilateral acts by presidents are similar to the effects of short wars 
and start of wars. For every quarter in which presidents engaged in military operations at 
least one day unilaterally, the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index returns increased 
about 3.5 percentage points. Because of lower Congress support and greater limitations 
imposed by War Powers Resolution, the market reacts positively to unilateral uses of 
force as these wars are supposed to be shorter and more cost-effective. The investors do 
not necessarily predict that these wars will be short and cost-effective. Analysis from 
previous sections indicates that increased public support for short wars, the initial 
economic expansion, economic policy implemented for the war purposes and type of war 
financing might be responsible for this positive effect on stock market performance. 
However, because these variables were not incorporated into the regression analysis, it is 
undesirable to make any certain assumptions that these are factors are the underlying 
explanations for the positive relationship between unilateral acts and financial markets.  
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Table 7: Dow Jones Industrial Average Index (Real Change) Regression 
Results 
Variable Estimated Coefficients (Standard Error)   
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Beginning of 
War 
3.4641 3.5567   
(1.9396)* (1.5088)**    
War Duration -0.0219 -0.062   
(0.0394) (0.0304)    
Consumer 
Confidence 
Index 
5.5791 5.6541 5.9843 5.4399 
(0.9564)*** (0.9026)*** (0.9091)*** (0.8961)*** 
Unemployment 
Rate 
0.1646     
(0.4768)     
Real Debt (% 
∆) 
-0.1740     
(0.6726)     
Real GDP (% 
∆) 
0.6037 0.6169 -0.7367 0.5340 
(0.5709) (0.5627) (0.5575) (0.5505) 
Real Deficit (% 
∆) 
0.0002     
(0.0024)     
Inflation Rate 0.4816 0.5301 0.8267 0.4473 
(1.0667) (0.7453) (0.7797) (0.7470) 
Exchange Rate 
(GBP/USD) 
-1.5955 -1.8191 -2.4898 -1.3044 
(1.9732) (1.8767) (1.9866) (1.8456) 
Interest Rate -0.1096     
(0.1928)     
Short War   3.4841   
  (1.5088)**   
Medium War   -1.9371   
  (1.4805)   
Long War   0.2146   
  (1.2118)   
Unilateral Acts 
by the President 
   3.5488 
   (1.5569)** 
Congressionally 
Authorized 
Wars 
   -0.5399 
   (1.0607) 
Constant 3.9218 4.0569 4.7833 3.3312 
(4.0493) (2.8375) (2.9637) (2.8134) 
R2 0.2310 0.2291 0.2503 0.2429 
Note: See text for variable definitions and sources. The standard error is reported 
in parentheses beneath the estimated coefficient. *** indicates the significance at 
the 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level and * indicates 
significance at 10 percent level. 
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Discussion and Conclusion  
This chapter investigates the effect of war on the movement of quarterly percent changes 
in the return from Dow Jones Industrial Average index. Specifically, the impact of the 
length of the war and the outburst of the war was observed for its effect on return from 
DJIA index. While the results on the effect of the duration of war failed to explain the 
change in the financial market returns at a significant level, differences between the war 
types by length and use of war powers can be used to predict some movement in the 
DJIA index. Thus, the type of war led by the United States matters to the stock market 
and investors. A significant positive relationship was found between unilateral uses of 
force by President and stock market performance on a quarterly basis. Short duration, 
allocation of resources, public support for the quick and cost-effective war, and 
underlying macroeconomic effects of such wars (such as economic expansion, economic 
policy implementation and war financing) might explain why stock markets react 
positively to unilateral uses of force. Finding that short wars tend to increase the quarterly 
returns from the Dow Jones Industrial Average supports the prediction that war duration 
affects stock prices (Koubi, 2005). The stock market performance also increased because 
the start of war reduced the uncertainty caused by the “war risk.” To further investigate 
why unilateral acts had a positive impact on the stock market,  future research should 
incorporate different indicators of economic expansion, war financing variables and 
variables that describe the type of economic policy that the government implements. 
The “war puzzle” theory by Brune et al. (2012) was not confirmed as regression 
results on medium and long wars was statistically insignificant. Since quarterly data may 
not be able to capture the real effect of prolonged conflicts, future research should look at 
different units’ of war duration measurement (such as daily, weekly or monthly) to 
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analyzes further the impact of wars’ length on the movement in stock prices.   
Even though it was not a variable whose effects were initially observed, the 
consumers' confidence on the state of the economy had a large impact on the returns in 
financial markets. All four models showed that on a quarterly basis, for every percentage 
increase in the degree of optimism on the state of the economy is expected to increase the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average index return.  
The autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity made the regression results 
insignificant for the majority of the economic indicators and money measurements. This 
ARCH problem suggests that nonlinear time-series models should be used to analyze the 
investors’ perceptions of risk during the war and expected returns. This thesis provides a 
useful way for studying how investors and financial markets react during wartimes. 
Findings from this study have important implications for investors studying risk 
management today and in the future. 
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Chapter 5: Looking to the Future 
The adverse effects of wars on financial markets have caused many researchers to 
look deeper into the reactions of stock market to war shocks. Segmenting the war into 
pre-war, post-war and during-the war periods is central to the identification of specific 
factors that influence the United States financial market to react. This thesis seeks to 
show that the U.S. involvement in war has a significant effect on the U.S. stock market 
performance, specifically returns from Dow Jones Industrial Average.  
In the pre-war period, information from history and news seems to control the 
direction and magnitude of the war’s effect on stock prices. The anticipation of a future 
war depresses stock prices. An increase in probability of war will decrease stock prices, 
while the outburst of war will have a positive impact on the returns (Brune et al., p. 3). 
The only instance where the increase in war risk has a positive effect on stock markets is 
during major wars such as World War I and World War II (Ferguson, 2008, p. 468). 
Effects of wars of different scales and nature should not be generalized. Instead, specific 
war characteristics such as regulatory regimes or developments in military and 
technology should be accounted for when extracting lessons from history (Ferguson, 
2008, p. 436). Apart from this, war with prologue has a positive impact on stock prices 
while surprise wars and terrorist attacks magnify a decrease in financial returns (Brune et 
al. p. 3). 
During a war, “turning points,” or war events important to investors, had a much 
larger impact on stock markets by causing escalation of prices when the United States 
was winning the conflict. On the other side, when the United States was losing an 
important battle, stock market prices decreased (Chourdy, 2011).  Blips, or one-day war 
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shocks, had less of a severe impact on the stock market. Apart from these adverse effects, 
intensification of conflict may lead to a rally in the U.S. equity market (Schneider & 
Troeger, 2006, p. 642). The destination and social structure of countries where the U.S. is 
fighting war matters (Guidolin & La Ferrara, 2005). When it comes to international 
conflicts, the U.S. stock market has more positive reactions than negative ones. 
Polarization and the duration of war impact the magnitude and the direction of impact 
(positive or negative) on domestic financial market performance (Guidolin & La Ferrara, 
2005). 
After the war has ended, the financial stock market experiences major fluctuations 
in stock market returns. The reasons for this may be economic recessions, postwar 
policies and the costs of war influences financial markets in the post-war period 
(Chandler, 1967). War had adverse effects on specific sectors in the market (consumer 
discretionary and business equipment) as well as oil prices. Political securities could be 
used to predict the uncertainty of equity prices after the war ends (Leigh et al., 2003, p. 
2). 
It can be argued that, given the economic effects of the war, the United States 
ought to have a clearer system in place, demanded by people, about war. The argument 
that, on balance, war has positive effect on the stock market is not a reason to conclude 
that the status quo regarding war is acceptable. The war should not be promoted for 
economic or financial benefit, and costs to humanity should be taken into consideration. 
Politically, it can be argued that elected officials are undermining accountability to 
government, which is essential to a healthy democratic republic. Instead, many unilateral 
uses of force have impacted the United States economy, law making and budget 
allocation.  
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This research provides empirical evidence that war has a statistically significant 
impact on the returns from stock markets in the period between October 1960 and 
September 2015. Specifically, the outburst of a war and wars that last less than six 
months increase the percent change in return from Dow Jones Industrial Average index. 
The basis of the methodology is that the war’s impact can be determined by observing 
periods of change in volatility during a war. The thesis shows that the nature of war, 
conflict developments, ways of war financing, duration of war and timing of war 
influence the direction and magnitude of wars impact on the financial market in the 
United States.   
These findings can be applied to different areas of finance such as risk 
management, and corporate finance. In corporate finance, these estimations could be used 
to predict earnings of companies in a “war” or “peace” portfolio. Investors should require 
financial institutions and stock markets to identify, assess, monitor and control or 
mitigate risks that result from wars or terrorist attacks. In the pre-war and initial phase of 
war, “war risk” factor and Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) may reduce the uncertainty 
about future movement in prices. Identification of potential threats can help investors 
reduce uncertainty and make more accurate expectations about the volatility in financial 
markets.  
Future research should look into datasets that report variables in daily, weekly or 
monthly terms. While quarterly data is easier to use when identifying changes in trends 
and better for long-term strategic forecasting, they could overlook important and 
significant changes in returns from financial markets. Future research using daily data 
would account for lags and leads relationship and possibly avoid the autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) problem. By using ARCH or GARCH models, 
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deficiencies of least squares model can be corrected and predictions can be computed for 
each error term. These models could provide a volatility measure that can be used in 
financial decisions concerning war risk analysis. Apart from this, future research could 
use different market performance indicators within the United States, such as Standard & 
Poor's 500 (S&P 500), and indexes outside the United States, such as Financial Times 
Stock Exchange 100 (FTSE 100) Index or Shanghai (SSE) Composite Index. Future 
studies could also look further into war characteristics to explain adverse effects of 
different wars on the U.S. financial market. Some of the possible characteristics to be 
observed in the future could be the number of casualties, the level of innovation in 
technology and political structure of countries involved in the conflict. 
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